Utility and ‘paradise’

I’ve been reading a bit of David Lewis recently, one point he makes early on in his work “On the Plurality of Worlds”, is that the utility of a theory is a reason for accepting that it is true. The non-philosophical example he gives is in set theory, construct your sets and ontology however way which you want, and you get out what you want, by determinedly deciding one’s axioms and the conditions in which one may establish a theorem or establish some proof or impossibility by way of reductio.

Lewis quotes a phrase (apparently) from Hilbert, which goes something like “Set theory is a mathematician’s paradise”; likewise, we may also have a metaphysician’s paradise by way of thinking within the jargon of modal realism; of possibilia, logical space, closeness of worlds, while many object to the proposal of modal realism, the very fact that people still talk about it, and use the terminology of worlds, counterparts, and so on; is a testimony to the influence and power of this thesis.

While one has critical thoughts about this thesis (concerning isolation and the knowledge of worlds); there is an underlying appeal which must be taken seriously. Philosophy considered as establishing theories that balances a strength of a theory against its weakness. What are strong aspects to a theory? By theory, I mean not just metaphysical theories, but scientific theories, or even moral or empirical hypotheses as well.

A theory may have strengths in virtue of the following things:

1. Theoretical unity, interconnectedness
2. Parsimony
3. Explanation
4. Confirmable predictions
5. Upgrading past theories
6. Refuting contemporamous competing theories
7. Being formalised, mathematicised

A theory, while emphasising one of these things, may also have a cost:

1. Being empirically false
2. Being non-empirical
3. Being inapplicable to higher genera concepts
4. Invoking weird ontologies
5. Violating parsimony
6. Incommensurability (ie. an incompatibility with other theories, or no address of corollorary issues)
7. Not having any predictive power

The spirit of utility arguments is that they are not so much arguments but appeals to truth. With utility one does not argue that something is or is not the case, as such, as in a formal deductive argument, but one appeals to the truth of something by its utility; to force the in another way: no other theories explain as much as this does; or if it does, then it is a better theory.

If we pursued this kind of line of metaphysics, we would have two implications:

1. Arguments are not so easy to knock down (hopefully); if we establish a thesis by many prongs, taking one prong away does not take away the thesis. This means we can concede to criticisms without complete abandonment and philosophy becomes essentially a concilatory project of theories and different metaphysical topics.
2. Philosophy would truly work in the old way of being systematic; we can show how one discourse relates to another; we may simultaneously be doing philosophy of mind and metaphysics; epistemology and philosophy of science; philosophy of mind and metaethics. Perhaps this issues would be more muddied up, admittedly, but we may find the age of the big systems arriving again. Lewis, in one’s eyes, is a systematic philosopher; but not one par excellence.

Michael

Confused Questions

1. Does it make sense to construe norms into the discourse of epistemology?
2. What are the status of the theoretical norms?
3. What theoretical norms are there?

We could have:

i. Ontological unity (naturalism – strong)
ii. Methodological unity (naturalism – weak)
iii. Conceptual unity (Transcendental)
iv. Systematicity (Transcendental)
v. A set of peacemeal norms, induction, parsimony etc.

4. Question-begging, how is induction set into a norm? This relates to the following question

5. If we assume inductive behaviour is inevitable (which, it kind of is), then there is a fact of the matter about the fact that we do use it; further, there is an inevitability about our use of it. Given its inevitability, is there an ought implies can consideration to be made? I see contrary tendencies as to the question of the rationality of questioning the epistemic practice that we deem inevitable (Cf. Stern 2000)

6. We may have epistemic norms of differing graces: strong norms like induction, or systematicity is stronger still, but we may have rules of thumb like parsimony; it may seem that the image is far from systematic, but Quinean-web-like

Destre (and Michael)

The ship of Stratovarius (on ideology and semantics)

Preamble

Anyone who is familiar with the metal scene of Finland knows about the recent spat between Timo Tolkki and the rest of the members of Stratovarius. In a previous post, I reported the news that Stratovarius broke up; but then came a whole barrage of replies from two parties; Timo Tolkki, and the rest of Stratovarius. These recent events are much like the whole open letter affair with Nightwish and their former singer. Has Finnish heavy metal become so big, that it has taken on the mechanics and suave of modern bands, of having official fan clubs, official merchandise, PAs, photoshoots and open letters? It seems long from the harked days of underground bands playing in California who were known by their audiences bootlegging their gigs, but that’s a whole other point at hand…

The heart of Stratovarius

I can engage in a suitably philosophical discussion about the semantics and modality of ‘Stratovarius’; but I want to address a more human point.

Stratovarius is a band that, for me, and a lot of people I know, represents a mindset. It is, I thought quite clearly, until recently, a band that was in tune with a lot of the heavy metal scene in Europe; trying to come to terms with the bleakness, superficiality, conformism and fostered attitude of normative-heterogeneity, by replying either by an expression of despair [such as EToS]; fantasy; or perseverence. Stratovarius represented the most noble of these responses: perseverence, the strength to keep fighting on in a world of superficiality. How ironic, and how disturbing I find it that Stratovarius engages in this kind of dispute. Not to take any sides on the issue, but when a band that for me, represents perseverence and a way of coping with the modern world, has infighting, one kind of loses hope in the message they once represented.

Now, for a rather odd analysis of ‘Stratovarius’….

The semantics of ‘Stratovarius’

Timo Tolkki, de re, was not the original founder of the band, contrast this to Tuomas’ role in Nightwish. It is Tuomas’ baptism of the band, that makes him the essential feature of the band; the necessary condition for ‘Nightwish’ to refer is that Tuomas is in it. Can we say the same for Timo and Strato? The short answer is yes (because he is the lyrical and musical direction of the whole band since 1984); but the long answer is no he fails to fulfill the de re necessity Kripke designator.

There have been many bands (my first thought on this is the Norweigian band Mayhem) which have none of the de re original members present in their current lineup, yet the name of the band still refers. This is obviously like the philosophical problem of identity, the Ship of Theseus; if you replace every plank, is it still the same ship?

In the case of Mayhem; some of the original members have left, and then returned; much like Ozzy Osbourne in Black Sabbath (replaced by Dio, Tony Martin, etc.); however, unlike Mayhem, Black Sabbath maintained the essential feature, the conponent of Tommy Iommi; who has, rather significantly, maintained throughout the whole career of Sabbath; being the creative force behind it, despite how most people associate it with Ozzy (or, as some of the fan discourses argue, Dio, but that very fact points out the finitude of the lead singer as being core to the band).

Is it possible, further, is it legitimate, semantically, for a band to have changed its whole membership and yet still refer by its original name? What of any organisation for that instance. Is the philosophy department of Cambridge still legitimate to claim heritage of Russell, Wittgenstein and Moore, even though they have long gone?

Michael

Commitments (Arithmetic)

A thought without a resolution; a question without an answer I propose in the following:

Consider the following statements:

i. The set of real numbers has a subset of entities which are prime

ii. There is always a higher prime number after any given prime number n

iii. Either there is a highest prime number, or there is not

iv. (It is necessarily the case that) If I entertain any candidate for a ‘highest prime number’; there will always be a higher prime

v. If there is either a highest prime number or there is not, and it is the case that there will always be a higher prime, then it is not the case that there is a highest prime number

vi. If the number line were finite, then perhaps there would be a highest prime number

These are all different kinds of statements:

i. Is a claim about a set of mathematical objects, an assertoric claim about the number line; but is it existential? Is it analytic? is it a priori? is it contingent or necessary?

ii. The expression ‘There is’ intuitively expresses an existential proposition, however, it is an existential proposition about a set (the set of prime numbers), which itself is part of a set (natural numbers); so, to say ‘there is’, in this context is necessarily elliptical upon the committment to the prime number and real number set; do any of these have existential commitment within itself?

iii. Is a disjunctive logical statement; the nature of a disjunction (PvQ) is such that P may hold as an assertoric claim, where Q may be complete nonsense; furthermore, do we have an exclusive (PvQ), where it is the case that (P&Q); or (P&¬(Q)) v ((¬P)&Q)? furthermore, if we address this issue of the inclusive or exclusive disjunction, is this an ontic claim about the metalanguage? Further; what rules can we assert about the construction of the grammar, and what is the status of these rules themselves?

v. Is a modus ponens; to what do I commit to when I assert modus ponens? Do I need to commit to P to assert P–>Q? Furthermore; do I need to assert the truth claim; or tacitly suppose the rule of modus ponens in order to assert any material implicature

iv. Is a necessity claim, and thus, a modal claim; how do we construct necessity claims at all? Do we need token entities to instantiate natural kinds to demarcate the neccessary? Or do we need to posit an Ersatz plurality to ensure the plenitude of possibilities being genuinely assertoric?

vi. This is a counterfactual; is it absurd to posit a counterfactual about a finite number line? For example; if the last number in the line was 100, and there was nothing above it; is this inconcievable, further, is this possible, but inconceivable? or impossible because its inconceivable? Finally, if we were a Lewisian Modal Realist; could we entertain modal claims about the nature of mathematics itself? or modal claims about the rules of modality? (for instance, saying ‘it’s possible to have a world where we are ersatzist, and another world which is Lewisian in logical space’? This sounds ridiculous a claim prima facie.

Destre (and Michael)

Moral Logic?

What if we were to say that a given modal logic could have a mapping relation upon another aspect of reasoning? Or in other words, if we could have a discourse or sets of truth values and operator functions about the world, in this case, modal logic, so our operators here would be at least necessity and possibility; but then to make a further claim that these operators, and moreover, their behaviour, have an isomorphism with another operation. For example…CAN isomorphs to POSSIBLE and OUGHT isomorphs to NECESSARY, we might be able to translate one discourse into another.
My suggestion, or hope, is, we could make a modal analysis of morality in such a way.

Sinistre*

Glass shattering, and Marble leftness

Lets say I have before me a glass of wine. If I were to throw it at my wall, the glass would presumably smash. The object (Gw) has the disposition of shatterability. After I shatter the glass, it no longer can shatter, as it no longer fulfills the condition of being a glass. Perhaps this is too metaphysical. Okay, lets give another story.

Let’s say I have three marbles before me in a line in front of me. These marbles have a certain character about them, marble 1 is to the left of 2,3; marble 3 is to the right of 1,2, and marble 2 is in between them. We may say that a term to describe their spatial index is contingent upon their positioning, and those objects besides them. If I remove marble 1, marble 2 becomes the leftmost marble in the line.

What is the nature of the leftness of marble 1. It is a contingent fact, but also an indexical relation. We could say it is much like the glass then, upon which the shatterability is contingent upon the fact, and thus, indexical to the property of, the glass being solid (and cool). Could we not go further and show it is the case that many properties we ascribe are indexical, and fickle; semantic rather than ontic ascriptions.

Destre

Is there an answer to every ‘why?’

If we are to posit a notion such as if there is a thing to be explained, it must be explainable. Let us call this (for now) explanatory rationalism. At first sight, it may seem like a very harmless principle; but when I think about iti, it seems very strong; but when I come down upon judging it as a good principle, I think it’s a very good principle if you can work it.

Explanatory rationalism is one of the starting points of Leibniz (and Spinoza)’s metaphysics. For some reason, I have this intuition that nothing is immune to examination; part of this is a socio-political norm; but as a rational principle as wello, it is a bit stronger. Two questions I bring up:

1. Is everything really subject to rigorous and systematic analysis in the way explanatory rationalism purports to; is there an answer to every ‘why’ question?

2. Explanatory rationalism is a motivation for metaphysics being built up; but, do we have to make a metaphysical system where we posit that weird things have to exist; or can we just have an analysis? I was quite taken aback when I was in a discussion with someone who maintained that conceptual analysis and metaphysics are fundamentally distinct.

Superficial remarks on arguments for God’s existence

let us now consider the contemporary atheist, and by this, I mean, the serious analytic philosopher, not some pissant musings on the divine is. I find a personal dislike of non philosophers talking about atheism, that is for that reason, that they are not have systematic concerns about the nature of reality. if I am going to raise a point about the nature of knowledge, the nature of time, the status of moral propositions, the status of the abstract entities, or the relation between thought and object, the relation between subject and world, I see no better candidate than those trained in the works of Aristotle, Quine, Kant, Leibniz, Russell, and so on.

I dislike those who purport atheism, but with no agenda, what I mean is that they have no agenda to explain the world. They may have an ad hoc answer to you, that of science. And normally a reply, that I had is this: how can you explain the incommensurability between the social world and the natural world, the status of social propositions, the status of number, the Socratic question, the nature of value, and, what I may push is the conceptual unity between propositions of value and propositions of fact, the system is to city between the whole world as we perceive it, a system that is the key to we must presuppose in order to make the world cognizable. Only a philosopher can answer this way. Call me prejudiced, but I like rigour and systematicity in my understanding of the world. I may agree with you in your end conclusion, but I will not appreciate poor argumentation. just because we agree on the conclusion, doesn’t mean I will accept a bad argument to the former. In philosophy, allies are made not in our conclusions, but in our method.

Now let me say little bit about the analytical style against the case of God. Most of these arguments are conceptual by their nature. We construct the conception of God, through some kind of ostensible definition, and we find a case that we could accept about the world, but goes against our definition. Sometimes enthymemes can be addressed. I do think of this current moment, the philosophy arguments for the existence of God fail, but we accept this conclusion only from a better dialectic. An example, perhaps it should be given: the ontological argument is often assumed to posit that existence is a predicable objects. this is the Humean objection, the Kantian objection is slightly different to this: existence, is not a determining predicate, this is I think weaker claim. We may accept existence is a predicate, but it would be won trivially so, and would not tell us anything determinative about a concept in question. My old tutor told me a good example: I can have a steak that is salty, and it is saltiness that is the characteristic of steak. if I asked you to bring me a cold beer, you shall understand what I am referring to when you understand what beer is and what it is to be cold. if I asked you for an existence beer, you would have no idea what I’m on about!

We could however, say that existence predicates the character of sets, this is a Fregean thought. We might also lead issues of metaphysics into the notion of Meinognian objects. But here we go into very dark issues, to discuss the notion of the ontological argument for the existence of God, is not something to take lightly. to realise the failure of these arguments is to realise the platitudes about the nature of existence, and the nature of abstract object. I think that these arguments for and against God become the ultimate philosophical exercises; they take us through many different lands, they take us beyond the question and into reality itself.

Michael (and Destre)

The kind of men that sicken me (Antisophie)

Adults are inadequate, they make inadequate children

Fuck, even within the ranks of my own, I find inadequate men.

Little girls are brought up, if properly at all, to have aspirations. Not just aspirations that are necessarily high, but at least unique, and fulfilling to them. Sometimes I wonder about the drudgery of the adults that taught them, as I now become an adult, I find the droll and hopeless despair of adult women a bore. Their hedonism, their broken dreams, their whoreish nature; and the compromise of their dignity that would offend Mill.

Perhaps I’ll talk about the ‘housewives in disguise’ another time. Now, lets talk about men!

I shall engage in a taxonomy of pathetic, weak men….

Men who judge by appearance (sleazebag)

Pathetic men are those who only like me because of my appearance; those who only hang around with me because I am attractive to them, as if I have nothing else about me other than my looks; as if I have nothing beyond my personality, I have no publication record, I have no artistic training, I have no unique interests in music or literature, I have no knowledge of philosophy; no, I’m just a pair of tits to them and a lovely body. Fuck them!

These are the kind of men who ‘fuck’ instead of make love; the men who say ‘looks and personality for me!’; as if they are to think if they found a wonderful personality, it would be completely disregarded, or they would have to think twice about engaging with the woman who they see as less than perfect. Such cruelty, such bastardry! Fuck them! These are not the men who deserve to rule; nor are they the kind of men who deserve to cary the moniker of those great ones before them.

Antisocial losers (or confabulators)

Men with no honour are those who think they are above others, as a mechanism for dealing with their own sense of inadequacy. Men who tend to denigrate all of those they don’t seem to be able to socialise with due to their own lack of confidence, but no! That’s not the reason to their eyes, the reason to their eyes is that they have no reason to talk, not even to be friendly? Not even to say one’s hello, to get to know others, or to enjoy in the very important political and human commodity known as friendship and civility?

No, instead, this confabulator tries to place himself above others to hide his own inner sense of shame by means of saying he is better than others, or by denigrating others by irrelevant factors, maybe their personality, or their appearance, or their interests, or their dress sense; just anything they can find to defame the other to cope with their own sense of inner inadequacy. I think its shameful when people, especially those who purport to upholding the ancient ways; hide those shameful revelations about their own lack of character from even themselves.

Men with no culture (internet swine)

Men with no culture are those who think their own particular bent of the world is the right one; oh, there is no world outside punk; for instance, there is no world outside boxing and snooker; we may also say. Those men who lay claim on being the vanguard of culture, those men who claim to have dignified and heritaged backgrounds, yet really, are just proletarian swine who have never known the difficulties of perfecting themselves, never trained really hard at a craft, or come across those different to them, coming outside of their comfort zone and facing new challenges. No, they just stay in their own rut. I think any adult who faces this mould is a pathetic failure of a human being, and deserves only the shame of his suicide; the shame that only himself can proffer, for he is not good enough even for others to shame him; he is beneath anything.

These can be scientists who haven’t read philosophy, artists who know nothing of the sciences, philosophers who know nothing of the sciences; or thos who purport to knowledge of a subject, but, under the Socratic lens, could never admit to it.

How do you reply to me?

If you reply to me by virtue of ad hominem, you have missed the point. The point I am making is this; we have no right to set standards upon other people and judge them, unless, we set those standards upon ourselves. Only those who are exceptionally cruel and sadistic and mercilessly demanding upon themselves can ever lay claim to difficult judgment and demand for action on others. That is my point, if you cannot live up to your standards, you are very weak; but additional to that, if you cannot aspire to your own limits, and in particular, breaking them; you are also undeserving of the priviliedge of being that one sperm that made it…

Be the one sperm of your father that should be proud that you made it; make sure that the other 6 million would not have been as good as you…

You pathetic men, (don’t worry, women will have their analysis of their inferiority soon enough…at least men invented calculus!)
Antisophie

Protected: “To think freely”; on the significance of independent thought [Unfinished]

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