Reading Foucault: Some observations

Reading Foucault is difficult; but one questions how it is that Foucault shall be read: for this question determines the latterly question: how shall Foucault be judged?

It is, despite my confidence about social theory, a whole minefield, of which I admit nothing interesting I can say about Foucault; comparatively however, the observations can be made:

1. It is strangely familiar to read Foucault, not in the writing style, nor even in the context; but in the conclusions made.

2. This is for a few reasons: Foucault’s terminology and work has been dispersed even if not by name unto many subjects: literary studies, social sciences, the humanities, (continental) philosophy..

3. There is a strange parallel to be made between Goffman (of whom I know a little bit more about) and Foucault:

i. Both seem to have interests in control mechanisms
ii. Both have ‘campaigning’ elements to them
iii. Both leer into the more morbid and dark and ‘outside’ (to use Goffmanian terminology) subjects of social relations and social structure; stigma, homosexuality, the ‘total institution’.

4. This parallel isvery unsubtle and there are many complexities to Foucault that I am not acknowledging.Very much, it is to say that Foucault’s work took place in the intellectually isolated environment of France, where little outside of it came through (except, of course, for the real ‘titans’ of the past – Freud, Marx, Hegel etc.)

5. It is interesting to read Foucault as a historian for two reasons:

i. If we understand Foucault as a historian, it sets a prospect for the kind of thing history can be: social commentary of the past to understand the present and future. I hold this wider perspective of our social and natural history to be ‘history par excellance’.
ii. Seeing Foucault as making a statement about our understanding as a result of, or in context of, past social beliefs/attitudes and institutional build makes Foucault look very favourable (much more so, than if we were to consider him a ’social theorist’, or ‘philosopher’).

Michael

Confused Questions

1. Does it make sense to construe norms into the discourse of epistemology?
2. What are the status of the theoretical norms?
3. What theoretical norms are there?

We could have:

i. Ontological unity (naturalism – strong)
ii. Methodological unity (naturalism – weak)
iii. Conceptual unity (Transcendental)
iv. Systematicity (Transcendental)
v. A set of peacemeal norms, induction, parsimony etc.

4. Question-begging, how is induction set into a norm? This relates to the following question

5. If we assume inductive behaviour is inevitable (which, it kind of is), then there is a fact of the matter about the fact that we do use it; further, there is an inevitability about our use of it. Given its inevitability, is there an ought implies can consideration to be made? I see contrary tendencies as to the question of the rationality of questioning the epistemic practice that we deem inevitable (Cf. Stern 2000)

6. We may have epistemic norms of differing graces: strong norms like induction, or systematicity is stronger still, but we may have rules of thumb like parsimony; it may seem that the image is far from systematic, but Quinean-web-like

Destre (and Michael)

What is the transcendent?

The transcendent is that which we cannot otherwise but believe, yet cannot prove; the a priori principles which, so fundamental, we may not prove, yet we must presuppose to legitimate all else of reality.

What makes something transcendental, if there is anything to be transcendental at all?

A Transcendental Deduction must be found; whereby we prove that an enthymeme is in place in our everyday epistemic practices and metaphysical construals, however; we must not, as a contingent matter, not have proved this relata in any other way.

What kind of things are transcendent? Belief in the external world, possibly induction and the place of other epistemic norms, or other metaphysical beliefs like the endurance of particulars, which, even in the face of rational doubt, we must otherwise assume.

Destre, Michael

The ship of Stratovarius (on ideology and semantics)

Preamble

Anyone who is familiar with the metal scene of Finland knows about the recent spat between Timo Tolkki and the rest of the members of Stratovarius. In a previous post, I reported the news that Stratovarius broke up; but then came a whole barrage of replies from two parties; Timo Tolkki, and the rest of Stratovarius. These recent events are much like the whole open letter affair with Nightwish and their former singer. Has Finnish heavy metal become so big, that it has taken on the mechanics and suave of modern bands, of having official fan clubs, official merchandise, PAs, photoshoots and open letters? It seems long from the harked days of underground bands playing in California who were known by their audiences bootlegging their gigs, but that’s a whole other point at hand…

The heart of Stratovarius

I can engage in a suitably philosophical discussion about the semantics and modality of ‘Stratovarius’; but I want to address a more human point.

Stratovarius is a band that, for me, and a lot of people I know, represents a mindset. It is, I thought quite clearly, until recently, a band that was in tune with a lot of the heavy metal scene in Europe; trying to come to terms with the bleakness, superficiality, conformism and fostered attitude of normative-heterogeneity, by replying either by an expression of despair [such as EToS]; fantasy; or perseverence. Stratovarius represented the most noble of these responses: perseverence, the strength to keep fighting on in a world of superficiality. How ironic, and how disturbing I find it that Stratovarius engages in this kind of dispute. Not to take any sides on the issue, but when a band that for me, represents perseverence and a way of coping with the modern world, has infighting, one kind of loses hope in the message they once represented.

Now, for a rather odd analysis of ‘Stratovarius’….

The semantics of ‘Stratovarius’

Timo Tolkki, de re, was not the original founder of the band, contrast this to Tuomas’ role in Nightwish. It is Tuomas’ baptism of the band, that makes him the essential feature of the band; the necessary condition for ‘Nightwish’ to refer is that Tuomas is in it. Can we say the same for Timo and Strato? The short answer is yes (because he is the lyrical and musical direction of the whole band since 1984); but the long answer is no he fails to fulfill the de re necessity Kripke designator.

There have been many bands (my first thought on this is the Norweigian band Mayhem) which have none of the de re original members present in their current lineup, yet the name of the band still refers. This is obviously like the philosophical problem of identity, the Ship of Theseus; if you replace every plank, is it still the same ship?

In the case of Mayhem; some of the original members have left, and then returned; much like Ozzy Osbourne in Black Sabbath (replaced by Dio, Tony Martin, etc.); however, unlike Mayhem, Black Sabbath maintained the essential feature, the conponent of Tommy Iommi; who has, rather significantly, maintained throughout the whole career of Sabbath; being the creative force behind it, despite how most people associate it with Ozzy (or, as some of the fan discourses argue, Dio, but that very fact points out the finitude of the lead singer as being core to the band).

Is it possible, further, is it legitimate, semantically, for a band to have changed its whole membership and yet still refer by its original name? What of any organisation for that instance. Is the philosophy department of Cambridge still legitimate to claim heritage of Russell, Wittgenstein and Moore, even though they have long gone?

Michael

Does philosophy have a foundation?

If we are to construe philosophy as having the highest degree of generality insofar as it legitimates and accounts for all intellectual practices, we may be justified in our belief of it as a queen of the sciences.

Kant proposed, I argue, that there are foundations to our thought, principles that regulate our thinking insofar as we are rational at all; these assumptions underpin the whole enterprise of exploration and thought itself. These reflective principles of judgment are; systematicity, unity, among others. Let us consider unity for now.

Unity is the ideal of knowledge being in a full continuum. That mathematics may be on the same par as aesthetics; that engineering with medicine; that metaphysics be on par with logic. What are the underlying regulative principles upon which they consist? It is such a construal of the question, if it can ever be answered, that may demonstrate the fundamental unity of knoweldge.

Does philosophy have a common base? This seems a most ridiculous suggestion, at least, prima facie. Given the law of a philosopher always having an equal yet opposite opponent; given that there are many who give strong arguments for theses so vastly distinct, and often, so vastly opposite; from atheism to realism, nominalism to realism.

Philosophers, if they are genuine of heritage from the tradition of Socrates; have the fundamental desire to understand, and express this by their fundamental of explaining. This is very vague, indeed. But to explain, one may, as a legitimate normative principle, must have something explainable. It is here, that we may input the desiderata of the principle of suffiicient reason; that every ‘why’ question has an answer.

We are but the immature child, who asks the parent why; the question of why in this child consists of a continuous enquiry, further and further they go, asking deeper truths of an explanation; why did x? why is this answer adequate? what constitutes an answer? why should I accept it?

Knowledge, and reality, we must conceive of the former insofar as we can understand the limits of the latter. Such is the transcendental project of philosophy.

Michael, Destre

Commitments (Arithmetic)

A thought without a resolution; a question without an answer I propose in the following:

Consider the following statements:

i. The set of real numbers has a subset of entities which are prime

ii. There is always a higher prime number after any given prime number n

iii. Either there is a highest prime number, or there is not

iv. (It is necessarily the case that) If I entertain any candidate for a ‘highest prime number’; there will always be a higher prime

v. If there is either a highest prime number or there is not, and it is the case that there will always be a higher prime, then it is not the case that there is a highest prime number

vi. If the number line were finite, then perhaps there would be a highest prime number

These are all different kinds of statements:

i. Is a claim about a set of mathematical objects, an assertoric claim about the number line; but is it existential? Is it analytic? is it a priori? is it contingent or necessary?

ii. The expression ‘There is’ intuitively expresses an existential proposition, however, it is an existential proposition about a set (the set of prime numbers), which itself is part of a set (natural numbers); so, to say ‘there is’, in this context is necessarily elliptical upon the committment to the prime number and real number set; do any of these have existential commitment within itself?

iii. Is a disjunctive logical statement; the nature of a disjunction (PvQ) is such that P may hold as an assertoric claim, where Q may be complete nonsense; furthermore, do we have an exclusive (PvQ), where it is the case that (P&Q); or (P&¬(Q)) v ((¬P)&Q)? furthermore, if we address this issue of the inclusive or exclusive disjunction, is this an ontic claim about the metalanguage? Further; what rules can we assert about the construction of the grammar, and what is the status of these rules themselves?

v. Is a modus ponens; to what do I commit to when I assert modus ponens? Do I need to commit to P to assert P–>Q? Furthermore; do I need to assert the truth claim; or tacitly suppose the rule of modus ponens in order to assert any material implicature

iv. Is a necessity claim, and thus, a modal claim; how do we construct necessity claims at all? Do we need token entities to instantiate natural kinds to demarcate the neccessary? Or do we need to posit an Ersatz plurality to ensure the plenitude of possibilities being genuinely assertoric?

vi. This is a counterfactual; is it absurd to posit a counterfactual about a finite number line? For example; if the last number in the line was 100, and there was nothing above it; is this inconcievable, further, is this possible, but inconceivable? or impossible because its inconceivable? Finally, if we were a Lewisian Modal Realist; could we entertain modal claims about the nature of mathematics itself? or modal claims about the rules of modality? (for instance, saying ‘it’s possible to have a world where we are ersatzist, and another world which is Lewisian in logical space’? This sounds ridiculous a claim prima facie.

Destre (and Michael)

Moral Logic?

What if we were to say that a given modal logic could have a mapping relation upon another aspect of reasoning? Or in other words, if we could have a discourse or sets of truth values and operator functions about the world, in this case, modal logic, so our operators here would be at least necessity and possibility; but then to make a further claim that these operators, and moreover, their behaviour, have an isomorphism with another operation. For example…CAN isomorphs to POSSIBLE and OUGHT isomorphs to NECESSARY, we might be able to translate one discourse into another.
My suggestion, or hope, is, we could make a modal analysis of morality in such a way.

Sinistre*

Is there an answer to every ‘why?’

If we are to posit a notion such as if there is a thing to be explained, it must be explainable. Let us call this (for now) explanatory rationalism. At first sight, it may seem like a very harmless principle; but when I think about iti, it seems very strong; but when I come down upon judging it as a good principle, I think it’s a very good principle if you can work it.

Explanatory rationalism is one of the starting points of Leibniz (and Spinoza)’s metaphysics. For some reason, I have this intuition that nothing is immune to examination; part of this is a socio-political norm; but as a rational principle as wello, it is a bit stronger. Two questions I bring up:

1. Is everything really subject to rigorous and systematic analysis in the way explanatory rationalism purports to; is there an answer to every ‘why’ question?

2. Explanatory rationalism is a motivation for metaphysics being built up; but, do we have to make a metaphysical system where we posit that weird things have to exist; or can we just have an analysis? I was quite taken aback when I was in a discussion with someone who maintained that conceptual analysis and metaphysics are fundamentally distinct.

Would you rather be a hero in a loser world; or a loser in a hero world? An intuition test…

Let me start off with a situation that I want you to think about:

What would you rather have in the world:

1. Living as a hero or eminent individual, in a world where people are, as a matter of fact, of the greatest offence and and repugnant of moral character. Where you live among them as an eminent individual. The whole world is of mediocre character and advancement, yet you are their most advanced inidividual, whom which they admire.
2. Being the same kind of person (in terms of your character dispositions, moral beliefs, motivations etc. but; everyone else in the world is much much more eminent than you, and you are the ridicule of society, in such a way that you pale to them in inferiority.

In both cases; lets say you are, in fact, the same person; but it is the world outside that is different. What world would you live in?

Conclusions?

I’d imagine (just a guess) that most of you would choose ‘2′. If that were true, would that identify some fact about our psychology? Namely, of an intuition about the reality of moral properties in the world?

Two thoughts if this is the case:

1. To say we have an intuition (strong or not) about moral properties doesn’t instantiate that they are true. Mackie (Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong) himself admits that we may have intuitions about morality, which are, very much cultural. This is, what he thinks is the failure of conceptual analysis;
the Judaeo-Christian morality imposed upon us has infected so much of our culture and thought (Anscombe believes this too; Modern Moral Philosophy [and, this doesn't mean you have to endorse any athiesm or disbelief about these religions, merely just acknowledge their cultural influence]).

2. I am doubtful (that means not certain either way); that this intuition test works. I may be begging the question in the way I have constructed the thought experiment that sort of implies the conclusion I want you to make.

Michael

Two thoughts on telos

I shall, in this piece, examine two curiosities.

1. Different senses of ‘telos’; if any?

2. Would I want to believe in a teleology?

Curiosity the first

1.1 In a previous post, we were considering the different ways in which the notion of explanatory rationalism, or the principle of sufficient reason. Another way that I could frame this issue as contrasted to the previous post, is to ask: how many ways can we cash out an answer to when someone says “everything happens for a reason”?

1.2 In a way, addressing the issue of telos is one way of trying to cash out this phrase. Or rather, a similar thought. I may try to understand telos as a way of cashing out an answer to the question: how do I cash out an justification to when someone uses the expression “there is an order to things”.

1.3 Telos may be separated into terms of:

i. Design

ii. Order

What is distinct about these two terms? Design is suggestive of explicit, and intended utility. Order, is a matter of a process of discovery, independent of reference to a designer.

1.31 We may say that a watch has design, but not order. A watch has design insofar as we legitimately infer that there were people who made it as the precondition of its existence.

1.32 We may say that a discourse in mathematics has an order. Say, for example, that thigns arithmetic may have certain mapping relations to another discourse; or, that some physical phenomenon is uniform. So here, we may go towards some notion of symmetry.

1.34 How may these two notions be different? Michael’s first thought is that design is a stronger, exclusive notion, wherein� order is a weaker, inclusive notion; the latter is inclusive and weaker insofar as it is ambivalent towards the issue of a designer. If, say, we find there is design in the human body, we may make a design inference, but if we refutte at the start that there could be design, or that design can be explained elsewhere, we may still maintain the notion of order that a design intuition has.

1.35 Another way to slice the difference between order and design: while the latter maintains it is impossible to be designer agnostic, the former is designer ambivalent.

1.4 Why should I explicit two notions of telos? Well, Kant points out, that on the one hand, we find a useful explanandum by an appeal to telos; it helps when we say that a bird’s beak is designed or ordered such that it helps in its default habitat; we want to hold to this intuitive use of language, but we don’t want to move from explanandum to explanans, positing nomic relations ,or making ontic commitments in relation to design. I admit perhaps this distinction doesn’t really hit upon an answer; but I’m wonder why Kant made the error in the Third Critique; or supposed error in making going further beyond the telos intuition towards a metaphysical claim. I have addressed Kant very bluntly here, to which I also apologise.

Shall I put it another way? We don’t seem to have gotten rid of teleological explanation in our intuitive langauge, and also, in our moral reasoning. We assume that there is some dynamic where good actions are linked to praise, and desert, where bad actions are linked to derision and punishment. Just look around the world; and this is far from the truth. We seem to have a moral telos; which may be a linguistic remnant of our Christian heritage…or some genuine intuition that we have highlighted. I favour the former answer, but the latter deserves to be exhausted completely before we make a commitment.

Curiosity the second

2. Do I want to believe in an order? That is, the question I pose.

2.1 The most poignant way in which I want there to be an order is in respect to moral conduct. As said before, our moral calculi links good acts to praiseworthy acts, and good acts to desert. So, a good act, like saving a life, may be seen as praiseworthy, we may say “well done!” to them, and we may desert them also, perhaps by giving them a reward, a hearty handshake, or a medal.

Sinistre*