The anti-secular

As a default position, I would say that I’d consider secularism to be a reasonable notion. That is, if we are to understand the notion of secularism as the separation of the influence of religious groups onto social and civic institutions. That said, it has come to my attention of two things that seem interesting cases.

1. Judaism has a system of ethics which is referred to as ‘law’. The significance of Jewish law that makes it really distinct is that a great many issues are considered under the Jewish framework of beliefs. Whether to turn a light on or off on the Sabbath is considered to some, a difficult issue. What kind of car should one buy, what food to eat and so on. It would be absurd to say that one should not be allowed to be informed by a religious conviction or doctrine or system of beliefs, but this seems to stand in a tension (but by no means a contradiction), with the notion that religious institutions should have no influence over social and civic affairs. There seems an important sense in which the notion of the secular is lacking in acknowledging this.

2. There is such a thing as an Islamic bank. I don’t know too much about it but I do understand that it has different problems and different benefits. In the current climate where finance and the financial system is in turmoil, it may seem an interesting and perhaps welcome difference to consider doing things differently. What makes an Islamic bank ‘Islamic’? The early bankers (so Max Weber will have us believe) were Calvinist protestants, we wouldn’t say that those early banks were ‘calvinist banks’ or ‘religious banks’, but happened to be in such and such a social background and situation that most of the banking founders were protestant calvinists afraid of going to hell*.

*Caveat: Consider the Weber thought as a counterfactual, in the sense that Weber’s actual historical evidence and account is wholly questionable.

We need more terminology about the notion of the secular.

Sinistre

Some ‘did-you-know’s

1. Apparently Jung gave seminars on Kundalini yoga (presumably signifying some knowledge of Indian philosophy)
2. Some people (not myself) consider Idealism to have links with Vedic and Buddhist philosophy
3. Some x-phi philosophers (or x-phiers) have noted a significant difference in epistemic intuitions between undergraduates from China and UGs from the USA

Sinistre*

views-by-numbers

It may be easy to make the mistake that a majority perspective is the correct one.

I recall a conversation where an evangelical Christian was making an appeal to faith, saying Christianity has millions of members, why is it that there are so many?

An answer such as because they’re stupid is still an acceptable possibility, it entails nothing of the truth of the matter what a majority believes.

A similar worry is voiced by Appiah on an article on the x-phi movement. Studies that quantify the opinions of what people think about moral situations do not really settle the truth of the matter, or what is actually morally relevant. Quantifying what people think about moral situations and their moral calculus is an interesting empirical fact, from which we may derive interesting sociological observations, but what it adds takes a lot more explanation to reach the level of ought propositions.

Furthermore, if a majority deem someone to be the finest artist or best musician, it is really the test of time as to whether they are an ephemeral and temporamous popularity, or if their appeal has anything that is close to universality.

Sinistre

Pessimistic metainduction

The argument against scientific realism originating from Laudan goes something like the following:

i. All past scientific theories have been deemed false
ii. If all scientific theories have been deemed false, then our most current scientific theory T should be expected to be superceded by a superior T’
iii. We have no reason to believe in the entities of a current theory T

This seems to me true but trivial, I would agree to some extent, but we may still have a scientific realism.

What if, however, we found that from an inductive inference, that we do not believe in a whole gamut of religions (lets say the set of all religions minus 1 or 2); if we have reasons (although unique to those religions themselves) to be convinced of the falsity of a religion or spiritual philosophy, can we judge it rational to dismiss religion in general from the inductive inference that all other religions are false?

Dawkins often puts it in an interesting way: we hardly believe in the deities of Thor or Zeus, and most Westerns hardly would believe in the Hindu Gods; we might dismiss it to the confine of culture to our belief in religion, corollorary to that, we may say that the cultural appeal gives us reason less to believe in the truth of that religion but more a testament to factors such as ethnic and cultural identity. Could pessimistic metainduction be made for an argument against religious belief? It seems almost as convincing as it is for the argument against scientific realism…

Sinistre

Rhetorical devices

Lately I have been thinking of argumentative devices that can sometimes be used to rhetorical effect; of course, when I say ‘argumentative devies’, that is not necessarily to give such strategies credence. Here are some once that have been going through my head of late:

Appeal to ‘defining terms’

This one is actually not terribly bad, but it is all too often used as a rhetorical, or a delaying device. The longer you can delay someone in a discussion, the more you may distract them from a point that you are afraid they may raise. Distract someone and you might get away with a criticism that you deserve.

One good way to do this is by appeal to definition. We might say, for instance:

i. But this depends on our terms
ii. It all depends on how we define x

Actually I don’t think that this is too bad, making definitions, clarifications and distinctions are very important so as to ensure that one is addressing the same concept, operator or referent. It is, however, an interesting strategy for use by a rhetorician towards one who may be afraid of expanding notions or addressing definitions. Some people try to give the iceburg illusion to others, that there is more depth towards what they might say, as a way to provoke or suggest the embarassment of the other, as if to suggest ‘I know more than you, don’t even try it’; it may be an interesting intimidation strategy, but is pretty bad to use in a bullying way.

That said, the ‘iceburg’ analogy can also ve very useful; simplify ideas for an audience, and do not let on everything either because it is unnecessary, too long, or simply, to provoke others to do their own independent research. Now to consider another rhetorical device…

Appeal to vocabulary (unnecessary jargon)

In a way, this is a twin principle to the first appeal to definition. If you throw in words without defining them, that is worthy of invoking an appeal to definition (this, I say, is a very legitimate use of such an appeal). Examples:

1. The problem with the current economy situation is the general problem of the subject becoming and object unto himself and others and engaging in the commodity fetishism of the capitalist economy (Marxism)

2. It is because of feminine values that women are discriminated; masculine values permeate the workplace (appeal to patriarchy)

If you impose terminology, we may impute it without assent to agreement; who is to say that these terms we may accept, who is to say that the vocabulary is properly defined, or if it is relevant? it is for this reason that in the presentation of an argument or any such case, definitions and initial terms beyond the common language, and even (nay, especially) terms of common language which have a very technical meaning (objective, representation, ‘if’-terms, ‘is’-terms) must be addressed.

S*

That age-old platitude…

…of “history repeats itself” comes to mind;
think 1930s,
think art deco and inaccessible music,
think prohibition,
think dancehalls,
think recession,
think drink and drugs,
think depression,
think socialism,
think ideological warfare,

remember a death of an empire,
remember the folk ideology,
remember Romanticism? the bricolage of postmodern nostalgia has turned on itself
remember Modernity? only left-wing intellectuals and the avant-garde do…
remember the problem of consumption,
over-buying,
we can sell and sell and sell, but the profit stops when we all have that latest thing

remember the cult of personality,
remember censorship,
remember when we had new ideas,
remember old ideas,
remember that age-old platitude…
ah, forget about it…

S*

Two questionable instances of permissable action

I want to consider two cases wherewhich we may find it difficult or perhaps immoral for someone to legitimately practice an activity. I want to think harder about it and perhaps change my mind about the prima facie perception that it is immoral.

Case 1: Ridiculous spenders

It is highly immoral, that, during our hard economic times, where people are losing jobs, finding it hard to make the breadline, and businesses are struggling, that there are those with ridiculous wealth that are keen to spend it on whatever they want, even if it includes fanciful and ridiculous and seemingly insulting activities.

Consider for instance, if someone was so rich, that they bought enough dye to fill an elevator with blood to imitate the scene from The Shining, or bought a mountain of Mars bars and then destroyed it, or bought a car made of gold (funny enough these do exist).

Thesis: We might think what ridiculous and insulting behaviour. We might think that these people are being socially irresponsible insofar as food is a valuable commodity, or their action shows their wealth while others are currently struggling to feed themselves. Indulgence, as an attitude, we might even say, is an affront to any kind of progress.

Antithesis: If more people buy, then others have the oppurtunity to sell. If no one buys, no one can sell. Consumer behaviour, no matter how indulgent (perhaps you might even say especially when indulgent) helps the economy, a ridiculous purchase may get commission, helps a store, helps an employee, helps a company, helps its workers, helps their families. So long as people spend, others earn. So long as others earn, we can all keep spending. The lingering question is obviously to whom the buck ends, but if we keep passing, that seems far from inert.

Case 2: Charlatan or Philistine behaviour

Consider the person who represents the dignity, integrity and other such virtues of their craft. The watchmaker represents the elegance, innovation, and individuality of human creation over factory production; the virtuoso musician represents the perseverence of practice and fine technique, individual, yet respectful and indebted to her history.

What if a watchmaker had a crappy casio watch? What if a virtuoso listened to philistine music? The contestation of their character is in the ideals that link to their activity, and the ‘off-stage’ item or practice that opposes it.

Thesis: this opposition of value endorsement shows inconsistency and a failure in character.

Antithesis: there may be some secondary adjudstments made before the rationalisation of the aforementioned offensive practice. Perhaps a distinction between the sacred and the profane (some people, for instance, distinguish between fucking and making love, playing and ‘performing’, singing and ‘reciting’)

[Edit: this is a fragment article]

Sinistre*