Reasons: notions of justification

Okay, I am running my own train when I am thinking about this, as epistemology is NOT my area.

Q1: Lets start with a personal question: Why does Michael like Tarot?

Enthymeme: We have established by the question one tacit premise: “Michael likes Tarot”

Q1 (corollorary): The question asks us; in virtue of what is this premise “Michael likes Tarot” true?

Intuitively, a type of justification for this involves a REASON; that is, a reason for believing, or, in other cases, a reason for acting.

A1: Reasons for Michael liking Tarot

R1: Technique as an important preference

R2: History as an important desideratum/necessary condition of liking Tarot

R3: Sentimentality

Now, these may suffice as reasons IFF the agent (Michael) actually endorses one of these reasons, as such, the application of reasons for belief is a psychological phenomenon.

Now, the question is, how far does this type of explanation go insofar as explainin other final causes of propositions?

Compare to say, a proof method

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