Okay, I am running my own train when I am thinking about this, as epistemology is NOT my area.
Q1: Lets start with a personal question: Why does Michael like Tarot?
Enthymeme: We have established by the question one tacit premise: “Michael likes Tarot”
Q1 (corollorary): The question asks us; in virtue of what is this premise “Michael likes Tarot” true?
Intuitively, a type of justification for this involves a REASON; that is, a reason for believing, or, in other cases, a reason for acting.
A1: Reasons for Michael liking Tarot
R1: Technique as an important preference
R2: History as an important desideratum/necessary condition of liking Tarot
Now, these may suffice as reasons IFF the agent (Michael) actually endorses one of these reasons, as such, the application of reasons for belief is a psychological phenomenon.
Now, the question is, how far does this type of explanation go insofar as explainin other final causes of propositions?
Compare to say, a proof method