Aphorisms of my friends

  1. To a priori say that ‘fantaticism is always wrong’ is the support of the very dogmatism we try to degrade. We must always entertain the possibility that even the most seemingly-absurd claim could be right [Antisophie]
  2. No one can say Kant was right without justifying the following: the distinction of Hume’s fork contra Quine; the legitimacy of the existence of a priori synthetic propositions; the a priori necessity of newtonian physics and its underlying Euclidian geometry. [Michael]
  3. The more I fall in love, the less my love means; only the first love is truest. A broken heart of a first love is the destruction of one’s purity, their humanity. Any attempt afterward to fall in love again, even if successful, can only be the simulation of that proverbial breaking of the hymen. Make your first time special, or lose your soul forever. [Sinistre]


A ‘schema’ and a ‘class’: a prima facie distinction

Quick post: Michael and I have been talking and we have this question:

Should we integrate talk about classes in relation to schema?

Obviously this is a question of how we define them; but are they releant to be defined in contrast with each other; of course this doesn’t have to be a contradistinctive definition, but defining them in a way in which we cut the cake so we can have both of them as whole pieces.

Our prima facie thought is this:

Class: a list of objects

Schema: a way in which to make lists

So schemata (scheme of schemes) denotes some kind of intentionality or design or rule about the way that classes behave.



Motivation for action: problems

‘Accidie, depression and listlessness’ are the terms that Zangwill uses to describe the problems that an Internalist about motivation needs to accomodate or give an account for and not deny in any case [2007]. These seem to be problematic for rationality and any conception of motivation, or the relation between belief and action, that we may have.

I shall have more to say on this issue in the future, hopefully.


Category schematisation

One ideosyncracy that Michael has (we may dispute this in the future). Is that he sees everything as subsuming into categories. This is perhaps one of his motivations towards Kant (and infrequent allusions to Aristotle). But Michael says he had this belief before he came across Kant; but found expression and fruit in the Kantian path of metaphysics.

Let me make some general points:

1. Category schematisation-anihilation techniques (k-ANT methods) are his main process of learning. Michael contends that it only works for himself, as it is designed for him. I and Sinistre have adopted kANT-style methods of exegesis.

2. We use the Category schemata in accordance to Ockham’s razor where possible. So, this is why if we put a post about fine art, or mathematics, they would go under ‘art’ or ‘metaphysics’ respectively. Despite this, we impose (perhaps artificially) other incompatible (purposely so) categories which are a different schematisation; so we use combinations of schema; it is a schemata in this sense.

3. Is there a universal category schema? Good question, Michael would say. His answer is it doesn’t matter. He’s not (yet) proposing a metaphysical system of these category schema that is universally applicable (would be nice though!). For his usage of the category schemata it does the job. Michael works to invent these weird methods to solve problems, I wish he did more mathematics and logic… 🙂

4. The Categorisation schemata has a practical application in our lives, which, paired with modern communication technologies, and computer software, has made the organisation of my life (and my alter-ego through D-Schema) and that of Michael’s and (I’ll admit for him,) Sinistre. Metaphysics of everyday life, I contend.

Michael isn’t happy when people write about him without his consent; so I shall end!


A master ‘set’

I have a question to which I have no answer to (because its not my area).


Does it make sense to talk of a set which contains all true statements about the world?


Destrean comments:

1. To have a fact in it does not necessarily entail the justification/demonstration of that fact (e.g. base principles like F=ma), but it will iff we are to accept the proof of any given fact as true in itself.

2. I’m deserving to be reminded of the conclusions of the 2nd Incompleteness theoremt; but I want a better explanation than the crappy folk explanation I have

3. I’m aware of Russell’s paradox; is this relevant? Furthermore, is it desirable (quid juris) to incorporate this by limiting he notion of the master set?

Is equivalence analytic?


  1. The above proposition states of an equivalence relation. Is 4=2+2?
  2. Is 4 definitionally 2+2=4?
  3. Furthermore, is 4 definitionally any arbitrary true proposition that sums up to it?
  4. Can we know, by analysis, an infinite set of propositions in order to fully understand a single term 4?
  5. Or, is it the case, that by 4, we construct, rather than take apart, a concept? (synthesis)

We need to understand these primitives in a truly naturalist way if we are to construct the ‘big theory’ of everything.