Thoughts about counterfactuals

Are all counterfactuals true?

I am consideirng ‘true’ counterfactuals instantiating a possible world; that is to say; if there is a true counterfacutal, there is a world whereby the counterfactual obtained.

EXAMPLE: If I were a doctor, I wouldn’t sleep with my patients.

If T = There is a world Wx whereby this inference obtained, that I was a doctor and I didn’t sleep with my patients

Is it also true, to say that THere is a world where the OPPOSITE counterfactual obtained?

So T= “If I were a doctor, I WOULD sleep with my patients” -> there is such a world Wy whereby the states of affairs obtained where I was a doctor and DID sleep with patients.

I am having critical thoughts about how we enter possible worlds ontology and semantics into our philosophical vocabulary.

Michael wants to work on investigating a Kantian response to Lewisian worlds. Lewis’ influence is undeniable, and in a good way.



2 thoughts on “Thoughts about counterfactuals

  1. It took me a while to come around to Lewis’ “modal realism”, but now I find myself quite in sync with what I suspect was his intention here. But I struggle with the pragmatics of possible worlds, in so much as I find the question of what qualifies as a possible world to be too vast a proposition to be useful.

    Is the claim that there is a possible world in which I am a bird (for instance) even meaningful?

    Must dash!

  2. That’s another question, Chris, about the identity over possible worlds…

    You are on the ball, indeed 🙂

    I hope you dash back to us here at Noumena soon…


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