Lets give a case:
I used to have quite bad motivations against the Deductive-Nomological model of constructing laws as a means to construing explanation, when it comes in regard to social phenomena. I favoured the conception of Hypothetico-Deduction (and a non-naturalist interpretation schema) whereby we understand the behaviours of people. I’m not so sure anymore; why?
A systematic philosopher should not be interested in one issue, and trying to construct the best position for one thing only
Kant’s principle of reflective judgment influences me here; we must seek ideals of systematicity insofar as we construe something as knowledge; in order to make something understandable, it should have relational qualities to that which we also deem as true.
What about the metaphysics wider than the behaviour of peoples? Causality, properties, laws, worlds, individuals, permanence and change, an underlying substratum…transcendental conditions, even?
Not to say that I know very much about Hempel (in fact, the opposite); but I should now suspend judgment on my old views about giving accounts in social science. I put forward the question to myself:
Ceteris Paribus; why should I favour one account over another?
(Lets just say A Bird encouraged me to change my mind)
Michael (in conversation with Sinistre*)