Lets say I have before me a glass of wine. If I were to throw it at my wall, the glass would presumably smash. The object (Gw) has the disposition of shatterability. After I shatter the glass, it no longer can shatter, as it no longer fulfills the condition of being a glass. Perhaps this is too metaphysical. Okay, lets give another story.
Let’s say I have three marbles before me in a line in front of me. These marbles have a certain character about them, marble 1 is to the left of 2,3; marble 3 is to the right of 1,2, and marble 2 is in between them. We may say that a term to describe their spatial index is contingent upon their positioning, and those objects besides them. If I remove marble 1, marble 2 becomes the leftmost marble in the line.
What is the nature of the leftness of marble 1. It is a contingent fact, but also an indexical relation. We could say it is much like the glass then, upon which the shatterability is contingent upon the fact, and thus, indexical to the property of, the glass being solid (and cool). Could we not go further and show it is the case that many properties we ascribe are indexical, and fickle; semantic rather than ontic ascriptions.