The desiderata of “the reasonable”

does the question prefix the answer?

1.1. Many people think that a question dictates the kind of answer it has. If we prefix a question of mathematics, or social affairs; we expect an answer of the according vocabulary. So, it makes no sense to ask what colour is the number 2? or, what is the meaning of life? [when the answer is 42].

1.2. So, we may prefix the first thought as a question: quest the question prefix the answer? Consider itself the very question “does the question prefix the answer?”; determines a bivalence in our answering scheme, the world of answers are limited to “yes” and “no”, rather than “blue” or “it is what you believe it to be”. For we consider the latter two to be a misunderstanding of the presuppositions of the question, a misunderstanding of the semantics of the question itself; and perhaps, a misunderstanding of the pragmatics in hand (for the more pretheoretic of you).

1.3. Lets say we throw up a counterexample; lets say, the meaning of life was actually 42; or it was a meaningful question to ask about the blueness of the number 2 (some people see numbers as colours, for instance). If this is an absurd thought, then read no further. But if it is within the realms of concievable thought to envisage a states of affairs in a close or far possible world, where the states of affairs are construed in an odd way; the very concievability may tell us that the truth contiions of propositions are not imbued within the logical syntax of the langauge.

As such, we may come up with, or question, a desiderata of the reasonable; which sets the definability of questions in relation to what kind of answers the pragmatics of the question entails. So, “are you free tonight?” presupposes “are you willing to come out with me?”; not “‘are you free tonight'”?



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