Ontological status

My recent thoughts has led a discussion between myself and Destre…

What are the ontological status’ of theoretical entities that differ discourse specific?

1. Physics: necessary concepts vs. dispensable concepts; useful vs. necesary fiction; unobserably true vs. observably false; unfalsifiable for truth conditions vs. exempt from truth conditions
2. Mathematics (axioms); setting the conditions of truth, or truth-apt propositions? Truth-bearing vs. truth-conferring?
3. Chemistry/Biology – dispensable concepts; if our catalogue of natural kinds change; does our structuration of them change? Two questions here to distinguish

3.a. Does specific components of our structuration, namely in the rules of construal of kinds change?
3.b. Does the fact that there is a structure remain the same?

Following Korner on Transcendental arguments, the test for the psychological necessity is to conceive, or pose the following: Is it possible to theorise such entities without a structure that lies systematic or schematic? (while prima facie this seems a valid and important question; ti also seems to me a pseudoquestion; for the entities cannot be entities without the underlying structure…but I need to show this fact)


You can leave a reply or comment here

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out /  Change )

Google photo

You are commenting using your Google account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s