I can talk about any old shit I like on this blog; cos it’s mine! So, I can put on a nightwish video, or something funny and random that I will allow antisophie to say; and now I would like to consider something very specific.
Buchdahl’s Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science, and other papers; suggest a highly complex account of the operations of a scientific (Transcendental) theory and methodology; we have the metaphysics, the construction of laws, theory revision, and even a model of belief credence fitted into the system.
I have never dared to try and understand it to some significant degree, but I also fear its inherently wrong, cos the book is like 40 years old.
Korner has a worrying suggestion in Categorial Frameworks; namely, that our systematisation of science entails our (historicised) metaphysics.
Does that mean then that the metaphysics of a relativity age must be different to the metaphysics of a Newtonian age? I am uneasy about this suggestion; while a system is flexible, its empirically flexible, not metaphysically flexible. another example of a metaphysical flexibility would be to ask is there a possible world where there are no enduring particulars; or is there a world where Leibniz’ law does not hold? I don’t like this suggestion. Forget even the issue of whether conceivability entails possibility…
Frameworks are not as such metaphysically inflexible; but they are far from arbitrary to be historicised.
Michael (and Destre)