I saw this article just a moment ago and I thought of a few things. The article mostly points out of a certain kind of hypocrisy about the recent CH4 show: Miss Naked Beauty
1. This is quite an enlightening perspective on the Miss Naked Beauty concept. Mainly, that it is inconsistent to try to promote a positive notion of femininity while on the other hand damning another kind of behaviour deemed unnacceptable to be feminine.
I’m not sure how one may cash this kind of claim out, we might have varied interpretations of 1.
i. ‘Real women’ is a derogatory term as we are all real women
ii. To reclassify feminine beauty in the way that the programme aspired is to merely dress a heteronormative up in a different way (I’m thinking something along the lines of an Althusser notion)
– I’ll follow the authenticity point in a moment.
2. The programme was vague in detailing propositional notions about how to challenge ideals about beauty.
– this, I think, is reasonable
3. It is contrary to promoting feminine beauty; more specifically, beauty-pageant style patriarchy, by having a show which boots off losers by virtue of their faults.
– there is a sense in which this is correct; but one is lead to having a more difficult, and perhaps tangential thought.
What would the feminist say to the way in which Kant sets up our aesthetic judgments?
For Kant, pleasure in the agreeable is not communicable without having some experiential base:
– Thought 1: would we not also add dispositional bases to the character of how we form aesthetic judgments?
– Thought 2: would this make talk about sexual desirability impossible to communicate? (my intuition about this says no)
– Thought 3: Is pleasure in the agreeable the proper way to conceptualise?
We might go along with the third thought and maintain that pleasure in the agreeable is not a great way to appropriate a conception of ‘feminine beauty’; and we may associate it in the domain of statements pertaining to what Kant refers to in his technical sense of ‘beauty’.
Judgement’s concerning beauty involve the feature of communicability; that i can assert the beauty. I may disagree with you but we are within the same vocabulary to discuss our views as to whether Sophia Loren were more beautiful than Audrey Hepburn. We should say however, that the claims to beauty are ‘alms ob’ assertoric. That is to say, our aesthetic statements about such matters of beauty are, under the character of what Kant’s description of reflective judgments’ those kings of claims which are not genuinely assertoric in the sense of claims about the natural world; but are of a more provisional nature.
If I am to assert an aesthetic claim, I make such an assertion that implores others to agree. To genuinely believe such a claim is the case, and that you must agree. Can we have genuine talk about ‘feminine’ beauty, or are we mistaken with agreeableness ( viz sexual desirability). If we were to entertain the idea firstly that femininity were a candidate for ‘beauty’; what relevant features would we appeal to in order to make such a discussion; further, one would have to maintain that some women are simply more beautiful than others. To claim this would be a desiderata of entering the talk of beauty and to deny this desideratum is to deny that femininity is a candidate for aesthetic discussion under the remit of the beautiful (in Kant’s sense).
We could, however, be led to a sense in which we may say that all women are beautiful/no women are beautiful/all are the same; but this too requires more working out, and one must disregard one’s own’s assent to any claim of splendour in the name of agreeableness (in Kant’s sense of the latter term).
This remains to me, a disjointed and unresolved set of thoughts.