Aristotle in the shadows

At the moment I’m reading a book which is emphasising the importance of Aristotle’s critique of economy and politics as a basis for the of the way that the early social theorists framed their thought. As well as this, I seem to hear Rienhold Niebuhr’s name mentioned a lot, that is very obscure that so many people know the theologian, but I digress…

As well as reading Aristotle, it has made me more sensitive to when Aristotle is referenced. A couple of weeks ago, there was a letter in the (I think) Times Educational Supplement by a Frank Furedi concerning the importance of Aristotle’s ‘Phronesis’ applied in higher education policy, and policy in general. The point he made was of a general critique of the status quo.

If social theory is anything, it is a critique of the status quo. But why do we find ourselves constantly going back to Aristotle in terms of his Ethical writings? I suspect that it is direct, yet diverse. To be the greatest bodybuilder means something different than to be the greatest engineer, but both involve temperance and a practical wisdom to face a given situation or set of situations. I’ve also come across a TED Talk (by Barry Schwartz) which mentions that the ‘profit incentive’ which is assumed as a dogma among the media pundits of today, and many people who think that the seeking of profit is either an unadulterated good, or a nuanced but necessary good, does not have to be the case.

I am hardly a person to understand the nuances of Aristotle’s psychology, but I find it interesting that his approach, which is distinctly outside of the Christian tradition (by time, but not by influence) is finding influence. I used to often hear the critique among many persons that Marx gets it wrong in terms of his philosophical anthropology, but he’s one of the few social thinkers who really attempt philosophical anthropology. Perhaps he may have been wrong with anthropology, but the inference to begin with human nature and then conclude the conditions of wellbeing for communal human nature is distinctly in the Aristotelian style of philosophising.

I’ve said this in many blog comments and perhaps even personal conversations: I utterly dislike the way that current politicians (especially those who wear a green tie with a yellow coloured party symbol) use the terms of ‘fairness’ and ‘justice’ or ‘equality’ and ‘freedom’ in such clandestine ways that we don’t really know what is meant, nor is there any attempt to justify them.  A certain amount of clarity, as well as the transparency of one’s reasoning is fundamentally important, not just for the wellbeing and oppurtunity of genuine political involvement of the people (demos), but also for the justified authority of the state.

Michael
(editorial: I found the links to refrerenced articles and put the URL’s up)

“Aristotle transition”: from moral psychology to political critique

Lately I’ve thought about a collection of vaguely related things which I’m now trying to put together in my thoughts in this post. My favourite stories include the three great Epics that look at the heroes of the Trojan war. Homer’s Iliad is a catalogue of the destruction and violence in the conflict shown mainly from the Greek side, it was (so apochypha says) one of the first times that Hellenes came together for an alliance. I’m reminded of the line from the intro script of Star Wars: Revenge of the Sith which says ‘there are heroes on both sides’ (which in the case of the Clone Wars, wasn’t really the case, its more that there were villains on both sides and it was the same person).

The Odyssey is slightly more a human story about the after effects of war. Particularly including the female plight of Penelope, and the pathos of Odysseus who wishes simply to return home. Many stories tell of those who still face a battle of other sorts after their war has finished. The Aeneid takes an interesting Roman take on the legend; where the perspective of the losers of the war gives a greater understanding of the human condition. Compare Achilleus who is a man at his best in the winning side of a war, against say Aeneas (or even Odysseus), the latter of which are men although great, show fatigue and signs of wear. The world for them is far from perfect but they must show eminence in some way. I’ve always romanticised of the Greek way of thinking (in philosophy, culture, history) to have reflected this kind of masculinity. Perhaps it is the philosophers Plato (himself a wrestler) and Aristotle (by an unrelated coincidence a tutor to one of the greatest real-life military leaders) who try to capture that Homeric heroism. In putting Homeric heroes into this philosophic context, I pose a general question: is a person great in spite of their situation, or because of it?

Aristotle’s ethics of excellence

Aristotle writes his ethical works in a wider systematic context that from moral psychology, we then transition to a discussion of politics. That is to say, from the individual’s constitution and his nature, we may then go on to understand the behaviour of individuals in a community. This is the nature of politics and the state for Aristotle. Let’s start off with considering some aspects of Aristotle’s normative notions about ethics, Aristotle considers what thing there is as an intention or an object of endeavour that is to be pursued not for any reason but itself, this would be happiness. It seems that for Aristotle, there are many different ways for people to pursue that happiness and many people would not have the same route to it. As part of Aristotle’s wider teleological view of the world, a person is best when they perform the function that they are best at. Excellence (arete) is associated with happiness. To be the best you can be is to fulfill your highest good. For Achilleus that means being the greatest of warriors and for Odysseus it means to have great cunning to see you through many dangers.

Aristotle differs from Plato in that the latter places a high emphasis on knowledge, and basing virtue as knowledge. To be a virtuous person is to know what virtue is, and to know what virtue is seems sufficient for virtue as a person’s state of being. This sound very intellectual and invites its own sorts of issues (and it’s probably an overstatement of an early Plato). Aristotle bases his notion of human well being on action. In the vein of numerous 80s movies: money walks and bullshit talks; you can talk the talk but can you walk the walk? The practical ethic of my life is that words mean nothing (sorry readers), words mean nothing without real action. My personal ethic is that the great measures of a person involve the things not said.

Aristotle perhaps even more than Kant, chimes into my everyday sensibility about living. For Aristotle there are different kinds of skilled persons, there is the intellectual whose aim is knowledge, the communal person whose aim is the wellbeing of the communion of people in the state, and there are those who aim for eminence in a specific skill or craft (and I’d add anachronistically, their ‘art’). These people strive for the good in their own ways it seems. Although I cannot speak much more for my understanding of how Aristotle understands the intellectual type specifically, it seems that he has a general statement about how wellbeing is achieved for all three of these kinds of individuals.

Virtue is achieved by being great at whatever lot your life is in; whether a good politician, a good scientist or a good carpenter. Skills in these domains involve a degree of action as well as theoretical knowledge. Aristotle says how theoretical knowledge of virtue is a comfort in one sense, and a hindrance in another. It’s like when you give someone encouragement and the words alone make them feel better, but if you tell them to follow that encouragement through (or perhaps more colloquially put: get off your arse and get on with it), motivation seems a bit less. Words are comforting exactly because they are not action, it is not enough to know what is good or virtuous but to act on it. I think this is the essence of the common phrase: ‘easier said than done’. I’m reminded of this Aesop fable:

 

A pair of Oxen were drawing a heavily loaded wagon along a miry country road. They had to use all their strength to pull the wagon, but they did not complain.

The Wheels of the wagon were of a different sort. Though the task they had to do was very light compared with that of the Oxen, they creaked and groaned at every turn. The poor Oxen, pulling with all their might to draw the wagon through the deep mud, had their ears filled with the loud complaining of the Wheels. And this, you may well know, made their work so much the harder to endure.

“Silence!” the Oxen cried at last, out of patience. “What have you Wheels to complain about so loudly? We are drawing all the weight, not you, and we are keeping still about it besides.”

They complain most who suffer least.

From Ethics to Politics

Aristotle makes a systematic shift from human psychology to political (or social) thinking. This is a shift that is replicated in many philosophers and thinkers after him, the Social Contract theoriest make this shift from an account of human nature to an (implicit) judgment of how best to deal with human nature in the political community and rule of law. Kant makes this shift and it seems in a sense very obvious to judge politics, or even economics on what our presumption of Human nature is. Perhaps the most obvious candidate of this is Karl Marx. Marx wrote about the value of labour and the value that work gives in people’s lives, that is to say, in his earlier works. Work and activity can indeed make one fulfilled in life, but where Marx gets critical is in identifying conditions of working where oppression and exploitation subvert the value of work as fulfillment to work as misery. In this light, we may see Marx as following a long tradition of philosophical reasoning as following political thinking from human nature. I remember Alain de Botton stating in an interview not long ago that he believed governments should be more ‘paternalistic’ and tell people more how to behave, or better stated, encourage people to achieve wellbeing. There are some of initiatives to encourage policy to integrate with the aim of encouraging wellbeing today in various thinktanks such as the New Economics Foundation or the Transition Town movement.

Aristotle did something amazing in his time for a philosopher, he commented on his contemporary political situation. In the Politics, Aristotle compares the different contemporamous and historical forms of governance and weighed up their advantages and disadvantages. Keeping wellbeing in his mind, Aristotle critically considered the citystates of Carthage and Sparta in relation to how wellbeing is achieved among their people. Aristotle also had considerations about the structure of society in relation to how it fulfilled the ‘telos’ of collective wellbeing. The state had a role as the institutions of family and commerce in the life of the fulfilled (or unfulfilled) person, it almost reminds me of Althusser. George McCarthy’s ‘Dreams in Exile’ (which I’m still reading) makes a point that we should consider Aristotle as a sociological thinker, and indeed he is. Consider especially one of his surviving works, the ‘Athenian Constitution’ (well it’s probably not actually his writings but it would have had his blessing), which is seen now as a work of history, an understanding of the political history of Athens also involves an understanding of the implications of the changes, civil instabilities and policies which affected the life of the Athenian. Aristotle compares favourably to a sociologist today, but perhaps sociologists should be more philosophical.

The Case of Priam

“I have endured what no one on earth has ever done before. I kiss the hands of the man who killed my son.”

Consider the importance of human wellbeing. Can we achieve wellbeing on our own, or can some situations make wellbeing impossible? This very question invites social critique and critique of the political economy of today. There are many historical contingencies that form our present, but beneath the contingent and changeable conditions, is a general human nature. Aristotle gives the example of how Priam, the Trojan King who loses everything, yet remains a great man, is robbed of wellbeing. Great men and women are blighted by many situations outside of their control, from war, economy, to natural disasters; experience perhaps shows contrary to that old adege of Plato that ‘the good man cannot be harmed’.

Wellbeing is far more than simply egoism and the individualistic search for happiness. Wellbeing involves a social and economic system. Wellbeing involves the dynamics of inequalities and social injustices. As a methodological point, Aristotle starts from his notion of human nature to create the critique of politics that he makes. Aristotle made the point of how the profit motive is not conducive to happiness and we should not suppose that profit and gain is unlimited, much like our resources.

It is also fair to say that the economic system in 3rdC Athens is much different today, how different exactly I’m not fine grained enough to say, but I suppose we can consider how industries such as technology and manufacturing, energy and entertainment take such predominance and influence today in a way I am not sure is comparable to the ancient world. However is the world so different that Aristotle’s ‘transition’ from ethics to political critique is not relevant? I should rather change it to another question: is it possible that famine, social inequalities and war are able to be a light on people’s happiness, irrespective of how virtuous they are as people? If the answer is yes, then Aristotle’s methodological transition has a lot of potential for sociological method.

Michael

All rivers run through Vienna

I wanted to write a self-indulgent post that says nothing at all.

I’ve recieved a copy of a book that I’m set to review for The Marxist Review of Books. Looking at the blurb, and the contents, I find a very interesting read ahead.

The book I’m set to read is ‘Dreams in Exile: Rediscovering Science and Ethics in Ninteenth-Century Social Theory’, by George E. McCarthy. The book sets itself a task (so the blurb and intro seem) to relate Aristotle and Kant to the theoretical underpinnings of early Sociologists and sociology theory. Both the subjects of Kant and social theory are close to heart, and the chapter headings look pretentious and verbose. While this doesn’t look terribly prospectful, it is a book about philosophy and social theory written by a sociologist (sociologists don’t have a reputation for much classical learning) which itself seems an interesting mix of insights.

Also, this looks interesting from a personal view because some of my postgrad work was on Kant and the origins of social science.

Just an aside, I found out that Otto Neurath (the figurehead of the Vienna Circle and proponent of the Unity of Science movement) had an economics background and he also had Ferdinand Toennies as a supervisor. The link between the early social sciences and philosophical thinking is a fascinating aspect of the history of the mid-19thC to the early 20thC, especially as its rivers run through Vienna.

Michael

Pluralism, the non religious and intolerance (Linkspam of the week)

I’d like to highlight a few URLs that I’ve come across this week that I’d like to frame in a single post.

My twitter subscription to Three Faiths Forum gave a neat link to an article by a C. Steadman about the case for the non-religious to be involved in interfaith work. We’ve posted before about this and I find this article a very eloquent justification, as well a neat assertion of the case that there is no incompatibility by having a commitment to the social justice component of interfaith work and having no religious affiliation.

Thinking about the ‘other side’, there is a fascinating interview with Neil deGrasse Tyson (who I have come to know from his cameo on the Big Bang Theory [that’s a tv show not a cosmological hypothesis]) who states how much of his agenda in science communication is not interested very much in the issue of religion, however, one of his most viewed videos on youtube concerns a discussion with R. Dawkins where he makes the very interesting point that it is because of Dawkins’ eloquence of writing and putting forward his case that makes him prima facie antagonised by those of faith, in essence the notion of the ‘Angry atheist’ (in Steadman’s terms) is constructed by this kind of preconception or unwillingness to deal with the arguments in hand with (inter alia) the likes of Dawkins but more the conclusions made. For anyone who found this blog post for searching terms such as “Neil deGrasse Tyson” and “religion”, I apologise for adding to this reputation that Tyson does not want to have (in my defence, he’s blamed by Sheldon Cooper for the reclassification of Pluto – how’s that for changing a reputation).

Perhaps to put the importance of tolerance in context, this week a video came out of a grassroots protest led by the an organisation within the umbrella of US tea party movement where a ‘protest’ against speakers in a Muslim fundrasing event was obscured by the thinly veiled xenophobia of the protest’s participants. Such is the consequence of a lack of engagement or dialogue.

Antisophie

LSE’s ‘blood money’ allegation

We at the Noumenal Realm have taken a conscious decision to abstain from writing about a great many of the current affairs, but this is more because many of us are in conversation and we seem to end up at a lot of moot points that don’t really go anywhere (but then again, the same can be said about our thoughts on philosophy being moot). We have considered trying to write on the recent events over the Arab world but we are struggling to establish a ‘frame’ about it.

Anyway, one story has taken our irk lately. Michael has sent us a large spate of articles from the British broadsheet press of late and much of it has come out so quickly and reports are legion that clarity and erudition is sacrificed over sensationalism and repetition. Let’s focus on a specific story that has flared up the (otherwise) quiet area of Higher Education News. The civil unrest that began in Tunisia which has spread to Libya has led many media pundits to call out the behaviour of certain Heads of State and other officials who have made efforts to bridge a relationship with Libya in (what seems) predominantly economic relationships with the suggested intention of fostering also a cultural/political exchange. With this going on in the background, there have been reports which have emerged almost concurrently over the LSE which include:

  • The allegation that Col. Gadaffi’s son plagiarised his Doctoral thesis awarded by the London School of Economics (University of London)
  • The (substantiated) fact of Saif Gadaffi’s financial input into the LSE for a North African Research project
  • Reports of senior figures in the LSE involved with Libya with the suggested intent of educating the future political elite of the country

These allegations are seperate, but understandably, when public scrutiny comes into one specific issue, a variety of related issues will then emerge, this is natural for the inquisitive journalist to seek a story. However, the issues relating to each of them suggest that they are taken all together and amount to a single judgment or criticism, namely, the undermining of the intellectual independence of the LSE and the suggestion that Gadaffi’s doctorate was ‘bought’.

There are seperate stories here, which Lord Desai notably points out in a piece on the issue this week. Plagiarism is a serious issue, but it is also an issue for the internal scrutiny of the degree awarding body. Like legal cases, this is not the matter of public judgment. It is the primed conclusion (considering the cognitive bias literature) to bring up this story and then conjoin it with the suggestion that Gadaffi also had influence over the LSE by means of a charitable donation. Conjunction is a natural way to accrue beliefs, as Hume pointed out, but also as Hume pointed out, just because we see a phenomenon of class E(ffect) consequent to class C(ause), does not follow that all E’s follow C’s, but it is natural to believe so.

The issue of the LSE’s financial influence with Libya is a more complex issue which very much makes the nature of higher education necessarily political. The consequence of the sullying of the LSE’s reputation culminated in the resignation of its head. In some ways the LSE is a victim, but that is not to say it is without guilt. It may well be the case that the LSE accepted a donation from the Gadaffi family, but funds in higher education can be very political. Consider the case of the Templeton Foundation which Dawkins infamously called out as being a religiously oriented research body. Consider how much of the funding in Engineering departments come from organisations which are either directly or indirectly involved with the arms trade. Universities have been, and to a much larger extent currently are encouraged to find a wider range of funds which includes establishing relationships with a variety of bodies, and many of them have political or ideological commitments. With the culling of public funds that go to the university, the state has virtually handed this option of forging relationships as a strong suggestion.

The LSE is no different to many universities who make relationships to improve funds. I deem it an equivalence to call out the LSE’s involvement with Libya with all other universities who forge partnerships with organisations which conduct research into aerospace who then also are involved as defense contractors. The blood money accusation is the same, but there is much more than an allegation and accusation here in play with the LSE set of stories, it is a loss of face. The loss of face is in the fact that a history of British officials (not limited to the LSE) forging relationships with Arab states who are now facing serious criticism from within their own countries and without. Calling out such relationships and partnerships is important and a fairly legitimate excercise in journalism, but this story is obscured by the obvious demagogue terms on which the stories set themselves out.

Sinistre