Popper: two philosophical analogies (Part II: Popper, Einstein and theory change)

I’ve mentioned in a previous post that if we are to consider Kant as the philosopher of the Newtonian age, then Popper can certainly be considered as the Einsteinian philosopher. In this post, continuing my series of posts on Popper’s ‘Logik’ I will seemingly digress from Popper and consider Einstein. A caveat should be said here explicitly: I’m no Einstein expert, I’m no physicist and I’m definately no applied mathematician. Einstein is one of those figures that everyone wants to claim (such as Turing, or Newton – both of which are Great British intellectual heroes I might wish to claim). I have to admit of my own confusion in a lot of the issues addressed, particularly in how to read into Popper’s possible influence from Einstein or even how to read into Einstein’s ‘Sidelights on Relativity’. This post is more in the form of a monologue of me thinking aloud thank having an interpretative (or even consistent) view.

The quote

The resource of my understanding of Einstein comes from the collected ‘Sidelights on Relativity’ which is available on public domain, which I happened to be reading coincidently to Popper’s Logik (because Popper takes so long, I read ‘easier’ things parallel to it) . Popper cites Einstein in a passing fashion in one of his appendices as follows:

Varying and generalizing a well-known remark of Einstein’s, one might therefore characterize the empirical sciences as follows: In so far as a scientific statement speaks about reality, it must be falsifiable. and in so far as it is not falsifiable, it does not speak about reality.[Appendix I: Two Notes on Induction and Demarcation, 1933-1934 (First Note)]

A footnote also adds the original quotation:

Einstein, Geometrte und Erschung. 1921 pp.2f. Einstein said “In so far as the statements of mathematics speak about reality, they are not certain, and in so far as they are certain, they do not speak about reality. [Ibidem]

 

My confusion

The collection ‘Sidelights on Relativity’ contain two lectures that Einstein had delivered, one called “Ether and the Theory of Relativity” and the other (quoted in Popper) “Geometry and Experience”. I am going to express some amount of confusion on my part. When I initially read this appendix in Popper, I thought that he was referring to Einstein’s first essay in this collection, which can be construed as concerning the issue of falsification. I also misread Popper in thinking that he was making the suggestion that his notion of demarcation and falsification as some kind of philosophical version of Einstein’s account.

When I initially planned this blog post, I was going to address how I thought Popper thought of reality as some kind of Einsteinian.  After reading Einstein again, I deemed that the latter’s views are sufficiently interesting enough to merit a philosophical view. In the first note where Popper cites Einstein, he is trying to address how falsification differs in approach to the Wittgensteinian focus on ‘meaning’ and the Vienna school’s emphasis on verification. Often it is seen that verificationism and falsification are two peas in a pod or similar approaches. This is not so much the case, if anything this is a result of bad introductory teaching to philosophy where verification is taught as a doctrine by AJ Ayer, and then Falsification is presented as if it were some superior alternative (analogous to how Aristotle’s theories in epistemology are a response and improvement to Plato’s).

Popper wrote to clarify how he was not terribly concerned with the issue of the meaningfulness of propositions as the Vienna school were and the emphasis on verification was committed to a notion of science as truth, falsity and meaningfulness. Popper is concerned not with truth and falsity in science, and he goes into the notion of corroboration and ‘probability logic’ as an alternative.  Popper describes the Vienna verificationists (naming specifically Schlick) as following the Humean problem of induction. In trying to understand laws of nature (the Viennese way of framing the problem of induction) it must be ultimately decidable that the laws are determined by being verified as true or false. To generalise, all empirical instances of a law must be ultimately verifiable or falsifiable as a logical possibility.

Lets say we drop this assumption and say that it is not a desiderata that laws of nature must be empirically verified, the alternative that popper would give is his own account, which demands only that instances of natural laws are partially decided upon. That is to say, by establishing degrees of credence in understanding a phenomena by its occurences by observation: the more something happens the more probable it would happen under the same conditions next time. That’s not to say that grounds of past confirmations imply future instances. Popper sidesteps the ‘Humean’ problem of induction where Schlick (according to Popper’s characterisation) is trying to resolve the Hume problem.

Popper claims that his method originates by framing the problem in terms of demarcation which he considers more in line with Kant’s line of reasoning about the limits of scientific knowledge (I thought I already wrote about Kant!). Demarcation is a problem of establishing a criterion of how to discern issues of the empirical from issues of the metaphysical. Popper (as far as I can tell) does not outright critique the verificationists in this note, but I think that framing the issue in lieu of Kant and Hume is an implicit critique. Instead of engaging in an empirical problem of how natural phenomena which occur regularly are instances of laws of nature, a demarcation proponent would think this is one thought too many. The verificationists are trying to get rid of metaphysics as a set of pseudoproblems and yet Hume’s problem of induction is the most metaphysical of them all. Comparing a logic of science approach that has a starting point of Hume (induction) to a starting point of Kant (the limits of knowledge), we perhaps become more self critical of the extent to which we enter metaphysics in our logic of science.

Popper speaks of the asymmetric way verification works to confirm singular statements (Pb) but fails to cope with generalisations or higher order phenomena of which a singular statement (P) is a species of a greater genus (b). To account for this verificationists deem metaphysical notions of genera to be pseudo-problems at the cost of only confirming singleton events and not the larger phemonena of which they are familial to. The shift to Popper’s approach of demarcation goes to a more fundamental problem in epistemology, while verification srpings the problem itself.

I must admit that this sounds terribly vague in the sense that I’ve described statements and ‘familial genera of which a statement represents’ without actually exploring concrete cases or examples. This is bad writing on my part, and a characteristic problem with analytic metaphysics when it becomes so generalised a specific instance of the object in question (observations in the natural world) are not even addressed.

Enter Einstein.

Einstein’s potted history and its lessons

Einstein’s lectures in ‘Sidelights on Relativity’ are perhaps a better way to frame the issues of scientific method, than even the responses are to answering them. Einstein has a philosopher’s air about him as the author of the ‘Sidelights’ because there is something inherently philosophical about the nature of scientific method and its history as he describes it. Einstein talks about two historical cases.

Case 1: Ether

What the hell is Ether? In this case, it is understood as the medium in which light travels. Ether is also known in other ambiguated ways, such as the theoretical ‘lightest element’ and even was a term of currency in the age of alchemy. The disambiguation of the term aether/ether is a subject of its own. Einstein is referring to Newton’s work on Optics specifically. At the time of Newton’s work on optics he postulated with absolute certainty that light must have a medium to travel in, posing the luminiferous ether worked to explain his account of light. The moral of Einstein’s first lecture (I’m giving away the punchline) is that as further work 19thC work in various areas of physics developed, it became increasingly difficult to account for the certainty of Newton’s assertion. Tools of the trade in physics became increasingly mathematical and the concept of ether became problematic to account for.

As successful research developed to furnish the conception of light, for instance the conclusion from the Maxwell equations that light is an electromagnetic wave. The combination of research and the analysis of the empirical findings by theorising put luminiferous ether into an increasingly problematic predicament. As the mathematical physics evolved to a point far beyond the 18thC conception of ether, there was an issue of commensurating it with what was known. The culmination of ether theory came from the work of Lorentz, whose results were also worked on by Poincare, at this point, Lorentz’ research made interesting observations, but ether was an increasingly queer object of science. The place of ether in the theory of light kept being reformulated and its role reduced.

Enter the hero of our story. What if it was possible to accept the results of Lorentz’ work without reference to ether at all? To speak of the development of the theory of light in this way is anachronistic in the sense that much of the work up to 1905 probably didn’t depict ether as some increasingly queer object of theory. However, it took the vision of Einstein to see that the results of Lorentz’ work can be preserved without reference to ether. There is a methodological lesson to be learned from Einstein’s story. The putative response is that this is a notion of parsimony or Ockham’s Razor. Perhaps, we might frame this as a Popperian victory for Einstein? Or perhaps we could see the thought of Popper’s logic of science expressed in this story as a victory for falsification as the ether is removed. Either way, one can see a continuity with Einstein’s potted history and Popper’s philosophy of science. However, it is the second story that Einstein gives where I find it more difficult to relate to Popper.

Case 2: Geometry

The transition from Newton to Einstein can be noted by the problem stated by the Viennese philosophers of Einstein’s day noted of Kant’s Newtonian commitments in his Transcendental Idealism. That is to say, his commitment to Euclidean geometry. Euclidean geometry consists of a set of assumptions about space that seem prima facie obvious (notably the notion that the closest way to get to two points is a straight line), in fact, Euclid’s writing of his geometry treatise (fragments as they are) have been influential to philosophical method in ways unexpected (but that’s another story).

The Einstein quote in Popper succinctly characterises the former’s message about geometry. Unlike other areas of mathematics, geometry should relate to the real world, going back to the semantic roots of the subject (geometry – land measurement), geometry succeeds or fails in terms of how accurately it works to frame the real world. The state of the art from the 19thC with Riemann up to Einstein’s own time in the first couple of decades in the 20thC are characterised by geometry shifting to post-Euclidean notions of space. No longer do we adhere to straight lines or infinitely long parallel lines but a world that can be both finite and boundless. The question of whether space (or the universe) is a finite or infinite commodity is addressed by Einstein, and Einstein comes down on the view that it will likely be an empirical matter over the coming century of whether the universe is finite or infinite.

Einstein establishes a desiderata for geometry to reach as far as possible a depiction of the real world by approximation. Insofar as a geometry approximates reality, it succeeds. A Popperian instantiation of corroboration perhaps? Many mathematical physicists or any scientist which has to deal with large mathematical models such as climate scientists often make the admission that their models are limited to the approximation of what is known and in doing so, accepts reasonable limitations of unknown factors which may come into play. While this is a limitation of the model it is a necessary one. We are no longer dealing with truths and falshoods in sciences, but in models, we corroborate and establish credences about potential outcomes.

The case of mathematics is an interesting one if we are going to be a Popperian. The beginning of ‘Geometry and Experience’ addresses the perception of mathematics as a certain body of knowledge, and one which often bases itself on axioms. Certainty has not much of a place in a model where ‘degrees of corroboration’ replaces truth and falsity. Kant’s ideal of knowledge was encapsulated by how he understood Newton, a mathematical natural philosopher who captured the empirical through the formal. The case of geometry could be said to be a shift from the otherwise axiomatic (and certain) type of mathematics that Einstein describes, because it is not axiomatic and certain but more approximating of reality. If we are going to give an account of the logic of science, do we exclude pure mathematics from its concern? For me, the status of mathematical truth in areas of pure mathematics is outside of the remit of Popper’s account.

Popper gives a justification for his motivations to shift from discussion of truth and falsity in science to degrees of corroboration. But what about mathematical knowledge? Is the logic of science seperate from an account of mathematics or is it simply not addressed in the context of pure mathematics? Is there still a place for (mathematical) certainty in Popper’s epistemology? Perhaps this is not a problem for Popper, if we concede to say that scientific knowledge is knowledge proper. Even still, if we are to consider knowledge simpliciter as consisting of a variety of forms of knowledge, an approach to the logic of science surely should consider the role of pure mathematics or the process of mathematical reasoning.

The case of mathematics is one which so far as I’ve read in the logik is not addressed. While the role of formalisation is addressed, mathematics itself remains curiously absent. I’m not quite sure what Popper learns from Einstein’s thoughts on the role of mathematics here, but then again I’m not quite sure what Einstein’s thoughts are either, specifically in the issue of approximation, whether Euclidean geometry should still be used in the frame of say, designing a building or designing a handheld consumer product?

Michael

Popper: two philosophical analogies (Part I: Kant, Popper and Certainty)

Introduction

Continuing my series of posts on Popper’s ‘Logic of Scientific Discovery’, I thought some reflections were due. I’ve technically finished the monograph, but I then realised that I have another 200 pages of Appendices and other such suffix-type notes that Popper wished to add to what he seemingly percieved to be his masterpiece. Popper sought to reflect more on his system of science, and in some ways hold the fort on certain issues, or even to think differently on some topics (but not so far as to change his mind significantly).

Throughout the book, Popper elaborates his views through elongated footnotes, such footnotes are pages long at times, and are comparable to the kind of footnotes that theologian Karl Barth left in his works. It almost looks sloppy on first sight, but the need for addressing tangential issues is important not only for clarifying Popper’s views for scholarly or exegetical purposes, but to also anticipate his critics (or perhaps, it amy seem, to respond to them). There is an interesting footnote for instance, pertaining to a discussion of truth where he starts with something like ‘since this publication, my friend Afred Tarski had informed me of his work on truth…’, with sentences like that, I am exceptionally frightened by the more highly technical aspects of this work.

I’d like to address some remarks on the conclusion of the monograph, as well as on one of the appendices, which consists of a piece written about Popper’s thought on falsification in relation to verification theory. I will frame my considerations by way of analogies, between Popper’s thought and that of Kant as well as Popper and Einstein.

Popper and Kant: Fallibility and Apodictic certainties

When we speak of ‘Knowledge’, we can mean a whole range of things. I take it for granted that the English word ‘knowledge’ in the philosophical tradition relates to the historical correlate terms of ‘episteme’ or ‘erkenntnis’. Epistemology usually, in the traditions of  Hume or Kant pertain to a specific kind of thing, facts, propositions and usually unchanging things. It is not the facts that change, it is whether we are right or wrong. This leaves aside the important question of what other forms of things we would normally consider as knowable are excluded, for instance, social knowledge or how facts are mediated by heirarchies, or introspective notions of self-knowledge: how is it to love someone as a form of knowing? This are issues which are valid but take place in a context some time after Popper.

Scientific knowledge and knowledge simpliciter

One question pertinent to the Vienna philosophers, or perhaps even to Early Modern philosophy, is whether epistemology pertains to to knowledge simpliciter. If we talk about knowledge simpliciter, we can include all things that we intuitively or construe as knowing. So, ‘Lois Lane loves Clark Kent’ or Batman’s moral conviction for vigilante justice count as forms of knowledge. It is more than suggestable to consider that when the modern philosophers, and especially the Vienna philosophers were doing epistemology, they were not so much thinking of knowledge simpliciter, but science as the paradigm case for what is knowable.

I pose an analogy with Kant and Popper, because the latter takes this seemingly for granted. Epistemology in the ‘Logik is scientific knowledge. Popper’s system is a system of science, if Popper were thinking about wider forms of knowledge, he’d probably want to use a different account than applying his mechanics of falsification and probability axioms to propositions or thoughts such as ‘I’m hungry’. Kant on the other hand seems to consider knowledge simpliciter. In Kant’s own period, his epistemology resmbles something of what we might now consider (albeit anachronistically) as a cognitive science, or foundations of cognition (without the neuroscience), Kant’s philosophy was part of a system, yes, but a system of understanding the human in a fundamentally holistic way. For Kant, epistemology was an important part of the way a being can know of the world, but this cognitive process in his transcendental Idealism also fed into his moral and ‘aesthetic’ theory. Popper has no such ambitions. In this way Popper and Kant are disanalogous.

To constantly make comparisons between Kant and Popper (which I have done) would seem to be disanalogous to Kant’s larger systematic concerns. However, an analogy can be made of a certain reading of Kant. If we are to consider Kant as having in mind (as well as ‘epistemology as knowledge simpliciter’) natural science as the paradigm case of knowledge, or what good agents should process as knowledge without reasonable doubts (as compared to Cartesian or Humean Doubt), then a good interpretative case can be made to frame Kant as a philosopher concerned with Scientific Epistemology. There are a few distinct reasons to adopt this view:

  • Kant’s explicit and implicit references to the success of the Newtonian ‘philosophy’. On the one hand Kant admires its success and sees it in a way that his philosophy should aspire to. Newton’s philosophy is a mix of rationalism in his use of formalisations and mathematical generalisations of reality which are not perceptually derived, as well as empiricism, in the fact that these observations pertain to the empirical, and are scrutinised by the empirical.
  • An extra note: despite Kant’s interest in the success of Newton’s natural philosophy, he takes to a certain disagreement to Newtonian method as he sees it. This is the primary concern of ‘Metaphysical Foundation of Natural Science’.
  • Kant’s familiarity with Lavousier’s emerging theory of oxygen against phlogiston is influential in the sections which relate to the ‘systematicity’ thesis, or in more Kantian terms, what he construes as the positive role of reason. Which is described towards the end of the First Critique.
  • Kant’s systematicity thesis is also described in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, the fact that Kant would expand his First Critique to wider concerns about natural science strongly suggests that Kant himself valued a connection between the conception of epistemology with ‘natural science as knowledge’
  • Lets say we don’t accept that it is the Historical Kant’s view that epistemology should take to scientific knowledge as its paradigm case: there is an historical connection between Kant’s writings on his considerations of natural science (in the Critical period) with the later work of the so-called ‘Neo-Kantian’ movement in the 19thC such as Hermann Cohen, Ernst Cassirer, and even Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach (despite the fact that both Carnap and Reichenbach made much effort to distance themselves from the more ‘metaphysical’ reputation of Kant).
  • Popper would be reacting to a ‘form’ of the neo-kantian influence of Reichenbach and Carnap, and in doing so shows his own influence. Popper himself admits of the Falsification and demarcation issue not to arise from Hume (as verificationists claim Hume), but more from Kant – this issue refers to different passages of Kant than I am concerned with for this post.

(but I digress)

At the end of the Logik, Popper makes a case for a distinct way of looking at scientific knowledge. Forget truth, science is about degrees and corroboration. Science is a matter of probabilistic models telling us whether a claim has more credence or less credence. Popper fleshes out this account by starting off with his initial conditions of demarcation and falsification, and then introduces a model of probability where the more instances or regularities of a formalised phenomena aggregates our belief in it. Truth and falsity are out of the picture. Science does not look like the Enlightenment certainties of old, but then again maybe it never did.

Many of the modern philosophers believed in truth as a bivalent affair. Something was either true or false. Further to this, scientific knowledge was often linked to necessary knowledge, and special kinds of scientific knowledge (such as mathematics/theoretical physics) was of the highest certainty, and once we get it correct, relates to the a priori necessary truths of reality. Popper will have none of this, however and this is where perhaps Kant and Popper will part ways permanently. For Kant, apodictic certainties were an important part of true knowledge, Kant’s icon of a good claim knowledge would have been how Lavousier’s oxygen trumped phlogiston, or the success of the Newtonian science. Ironically, it is in Popper (and we shall later see in Einstein), that it is the limit of the applicability of scientific notions that is the exact reason why falsification should be adhered. In short, for Kant, certainty was the paradigm bliss of knowledge with Newton’s physics as an example of it. For Popper, a post-Newtonian world where it was expected that our best theories today would probably not be our best theories tomorrow, Popper goes into some detail about his ‘reservations’ of how Quantum Mechanics is interpreted.

I’ve often tried to pose that any good theory of knowledge (that takes scientific knowledge as its paradigm case) must take into account the fact of theory change. I’ve often posed that Kant’s notion of systematicity, with the notion of what he calls ‘reflective judgment’ in the third critique, as an openess to accept that what our fundamental organisation of a priori concepts are can and will change. But to also accept the world of science as a series of certainties puts this a priori openness into repute. Often people such as Reichenbach have criticised Kant for his adherence to the ‘certainty’ of Newton’s physics to base his transcendental aesthetic ( the claim that space and time are assumed before experience) commits himself to metaphysical claims about space that are no longer applicable (namely, Euclidean geometry, which Newton himself presumes). Kant’s systematicity thesis has a lot to arm itself with, but Popper shows that an 18thC theory finds problems with holding to certainty in a 20thC age. Kant was a rationalist philosopher in the age of Newton. Post-Newton, Popper was a rationalist in the age of Einstein.

(Next post: Einstein and Popper)

More on Popper

As I’m trawling through more of Popper’s ‘Logic of Scientific Discovery’, I’ve come to learn more about this work than was putatively understood about it. As previously stated in my post on Popper, this work is far more than simply the ‘falsification thesis’ as normally construed. Falsification also is realised in a number of innovative ways (such as the ‘dimensionality’ of scientific sentences described previously). Falsification is also important in considering revisability.

Simplicity

Popper comes forward with a notion of simplicity, which goes something like: the more general a claim is and the more it can capture with a shorter expression, the better. This basically captures what simplicity is. This might sound obvious, but the contrasting position of conventionalism poses a situation where a thesis which is initially a generalised formulation may find ways of being contradicted and undermined, and in order for a body of theory to survive such empirical challenges it must introduce ‘auxillary statements’ to introduce consistency.

Comparing theories

If one is to compare one theoretical system with another, the factors for deciding one over the other concerns, what accounts for more truth and which does not. A simpler theory over one with too many auxillary hypotheses would be better because of the greater explanatory power of a simpler theory using less to explain just as much, or more. Auxillary hypotheses are also increasingly suspect as the greater number of caveats introduced are exactly introduced to avoid being contradicted by the real world. That is not to say that a real life theory may need auxillary hypotheses, after all, a physical theory needs to explain. These comparative factors are merely between idealised cases.

Probability considerations

I must admit this is a part I least understand. Popper introduces a set of probabilistic concerns that would establish a credence of a theory, some of the constraints are fairly non contraversial: a proposition should not conflict with other true statements, a claim that contradicts a true one should have a lower probability. Probability is introduced as having logical constraints. In this section Popper addresses the work of Richard Von Mises and Maynard Keynes in their work on probability. My initial suspicion was that logical constraints on probability were more about what is a factor in discounting the likelyhood of an event, rather than a positive thesis on how to construct probabilities. I perhaps retract this initial thought in the consideration of introducing two formal axioms of probability, which seem more logical than mathematical. I must make a note of connecting why people hold to much disdain of logical approaches to probability (and Carnap I add as a correlated philosopher on this issue), to the more contemporamous methods of probability in philosophy. Popper seems to introduce a distinction between ‘objective and subjective’ probabilities and seems to say that while objective approaches are better (as he so construes it), subjective approaches can be useful as well in certain cases.

I need to read more on probability. I am quite confounded in general about probability, but I see it as interesting that Popper introduces probability in an almost systematic way in his logic of science. Perhaps probability (or belief credence calculus) is an essential part to a system of science. We’ve come a long way from Kansas Hume in this issue.

The Kantian Popper (or the Popperian Kant?)

I’ve mentioned in many posts that I have been leisurely reading Popper’s ‘Logic of Scientific Discovery’. The further I go into it, the more I come to see his Vienna roots.

I admit something. I don’t know too much about Popper. I’ve always heard of Popper from second hand admirers among my sociologist friends who see him as one of the great heroes of LSE’s philsophical heritage (also included in that list are Lakatos and Feyrabend). I think perhaps I have misapprehended popper as a mid-late 20thC philosopher of science, the not-so-distant ancestors to the philosophers of science I had come to know in Bristol.

My Kant scholar approach is informed by a very minor understanding of the Vienna philosophers; I see them as having a distinctly Kantian heritage, despite their apparent anti-Kantian character. This route also follows the scholarship of the likes of Ernst Cassirer; who was for one note contemporamous to the great Vienna men. A more contemporary historian pertinent to this issue is Michael Friedman (I should add a tag as to how many references to Friedman this blog has).

I believe that Reichenbach’s notion of the constitutive a priori directly relates to what is understood as Kant’s ‘regulative a priori’ in his body of philosophy of science. As I have also considered; I think that the ‘foundations’ approach is a step forward and the supreme example of this, Carnap’s Aufbau, is a superior attempt at the philosophical foundations of what I think Kant’s desiderata for any future scientific theory must amount to. Did Kant anticipate a Carnap? That’s a question for another post.

For various exegetical reasons, I have maintained that Kant has set a series of conditions for what he called ‘science proper’ which included:

1. Reductionism: all propositions of science must relate to another by means of a higher order system to explain the principles of the lower order. Applied physics requires theoretical physics, theoretical physics requires calculus and calculus in turn requires certain metaphysical/mathematical foundation assumptions to allow the conditions of such to susue.

2. Relata by laws, higher and lower. A revised way of stating the above is to note that Kant (may have) believed that the relata of this higher lower ordering system that justifies higher and lower discourses takes place by explicitly formal laws; these laws must be formal insofar as they actually apply.

3. Systematicity, or the unity of science. These principles must form a system that relates one kind of physical phenomenon with anohter. A general physics must account for all of its constituent parts; matter, heat, sound, energy, motion etc. If we had a theory of planetary motion (such as astrology) that made predictions and claims about a person’s wellbeing and future; it would only be a respectable theory (well, one reason at least) if it had something to say or relate to say, the notion of elements; heat; energy; conservation of mass, and they all in turn were candidates or subsets of a higher formal system; say, a mathematics of change (calculus) or general principles that took place over it as a genera, and yet formed the foundations of the given discourse astrology.

Popper’s vision of science seems distinctly Kantian as he says the following:

1. We must understand scientific principles as universal claims; and even thought there are doubts about the validation of every instance of F=ma (due to the limitations ofthe universe and our own means  of testability – namely, we can’t live forever and there is a great dataset of cases that we can no longer verify because they belong in the past). It is better, to crudely state it; to be a universals advocate of the sentences of science and to underlay them as a formal substructure of sentences; than to take the empiricist vision of dealing only with particulars.

2. Particulars cannot take us far enough with induction. Induction has its own epistemological and psychological problems. Which is our motivation to take a more rationalist ‘foundations’ approach.

3. The formal structure of science seems to take great precedence in Popper’s theory. It does not matter that our formal laws cannot map to real observances, or even that real observances cannot map to their porpositional expression. An example of the latter is this: to say ‘I am hurt’ is of very detached relevance to the felt experience of pain. The very fact of your reading this shows that this message is coded in a propositional format. Perhaps the best way to communicate the fundamental inexpressability of those things that propositions relate to would be to make an example of a non-propositional utterance (‘ouch’), or to hit you.

4. The ‘alms ob’ premise. Kant takes to the notion that while we may always have doubts about whether the actual formalisation of science maintains true of the world; we must take to the transcendental assumption that the world as it appears to us is just that; we must take some things for face value, or understand things in the way that we are forced to understand it; because of the brute fact natureo f our understanding to make us think it so. The categories of the understanding such as causation or orientation are things we understand just because they are so; but it is always valid to question them.

Popper takes quite well to what some commentators (I think it’s Bennett and HW Cassirer) call the ‘as if’ premise. If we are to take to certain assumptions or theorisations of science as idealisations or things we may imagine are ‘as if they were true’.

5. The conditions of possibility. Popper holds that the systematisation of science requires what I’ll call a mother premise, namely; that there is one fundamental condition at the top of a scientific theory which acts as a decider of what the other norms are. In a sense, Popper provides the notion of what I sometimes call a metanorm; a norm that decides norms.

I’ve specifically interpreted systematicity to be a metanorm; although Popper does not seem to be directing systematicity; he does make one proviso that relates to it; that we have an ordering langauge that makes sense of instances of particulars by instituting language terms that denote them as type. If we are to pose ‘marsupial’ as a universal we will always have the problem that universals cannot be justified by every instance; but the admission of this objection seems to be treated by popper as some kind of merit of his theory; as it is the same problem that induction has, but induction does not pretend to aspire to universals, because it cant. Some form of idealisation, or a language of types that in turn are ordered by ranking principles; e.g. the Linnaean hierarchical taxonomy.

Popper makes a point of not confusing universal types with sets and classes; perhaps this is something a Kantian theory of science may benefit from. We may have entities that have one class description; but fit multiple classes and sets. Kangeroo is a marsupial >> mammal; but it is also under classses and sets such as ‘australasian’; creatures that keep their children in pouches; ‘cute and cuddly’ or ‘parodied in family guy’ and they can be classified as such without inconsistency.

The relationships with Kantian systematicity and Popper’s vision of science are very intricate and subtle. I’ve just written this post to acknowledge just some of the potential issues and exegetical similarities that they have.

I’m also pleasantly surprised of Popper’s outlook; perhaps I may take his scientific character to be more Viennese than I thought.

6. Demarcation as the condition of science. Like Kant, Popper talks about ‘proper science’ (but not in those words). The problem of science is not of induction (contra Humean thinkers); but demarcation; namely, the separation of science and non-science; science and metaphysics; epistemology qua knowledge and scientific method qua pseudo/philosophical psychology.

Demarcation acts as a methodological primary premise in a similar manner to how Kant’s notion of ‘conditions of possibility’ works.

Michael

Popper’s ‘two methods’

In the introduction to Popper’s Logic of scientific discovery; he elicits two important trends in his contemporamous philosophical age when it comes to approaching epistemology. In a sense these two trends more or less still resonate today; although both camps are significantly weaker in influence as they were say, 50-60 years ago. I found his apprasial quite refreshing in the sense that I would normally class both simply as ‘analytic’ approaches to philosophy; while they are still analytic, distinctions should be made. Popper addresses two styles of philosophical method: the linguistic and the ‘foundations’ approach. Both of which are flawed in their unique ways.

1. The linguistic approach seeks to account for phenomena by logical analysis and propositional calculus. This works well and has worked well in providing interesting philosophical analyses. To consider how we come to believe something, for instance, may be apprehended in generalised cases of belief forming schema; or the propositional calculus of what it means to know p. The linguistic approach tends to analyse tools rather than features of the world; and is apprehensive to appeals of the likes of say, psychology in its broadest sense. This, would be its downfall.

Popper likes some of the contributions of this linguistic approach; but to say that language and linguistic analysis fits every question of philosophy, from theoretical to practical; would simply be wrong. The linguistic approach to philosophy dominant in oxford in the 1950s boasted of a certain kind of arrogance; if it can’t be formalised, its worthless. Strawson opposed this tendency by turning the aforementioned maxim on its head: if it can be formalised: its worthless.

2. The ‘foundations’ approach: While the British were quite enjoying linguistic styles of philosophy, some of the great Vienna heroes were interested in a foundations approach. Epistemology was largely a matter of scientific knowledge; thus the approach toward epistemology genera had become a notion of understanding science, for (assumption) science was the greatest candidate for human knowledge.

I myself would possibly agree that science is the great insight and token case of knowledge genera; but the so-called ‘social’ or ‘feminist’ epistemologists would have us move away from a strict notion of knowledge, and further away from the ‘tripartite’ definition of knowledge. The foundations approach can be attributed to the likes of Carnap; who proposed that the language of science (itself an interesting enthymeme) required a metalanguage or superstructure from which the underlying mathematical postulates/axioms are based upon even higher linguistic norms. I have to say I’m quite sympathetic to this project, Popper has a more open minded approach to philosophy; if we provide tools to solve problems, and reach the heart of certain problems; we are doing philosophy. If we are to follow the likes of Carnap’s Aufbau; we are immediately nailing our colours to the mast with certain important regards to philosophical method.

In considering Carnap’s Aufbau project, I often observe with interest the growth of the movement of so-called Formal Philosophy which attempts to mathematise as many aspects of philosophy as possible; from approaches to probability and rationality to epistemology; many, such as Hendricks and Leitgeb, wave the flag for the ‘foundations’ approach. Perhaps their enemy, similar to those who received Kant and Spinoza; was that people weren’t capable of fully understanding them, present company included.

Sinistre